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Since the mid-1970s, the global economy has been dominated by the spread of capitalist market 
economies, growing inequality and increasing ecological degradation. The latter may be the most 
serious of these trends. Human economic activities have reached a level that is bound to instigate 
irreversible change to the global environment, creating conditions likely to be less conducive to human 
development. The market system demand curve is distorted if inequality is sufficiently great and the 
purchasing power has a greater impact on allocation than preferences. If we attempt to internalize the 
ecological costs of essential resources into their market prices, driving up price, the best case scenario 
is that the poor reduce consumption by more than the rich, even though the rich have been the 
primary drivers of ecological degradation. The thesis focuses on the food allocation and demand curve 
distortion. Mainstream economists argue that it is impossible to objectively compare marginal utility 
across individuals, and the best we can do is equate willingness to pay with utility. However, food 
consumption is a physiological need, and it is quite possible to objectively compare the marginal utility 
it provides to different individuals. Certainly, a malnourished person gains more from additional food 
than an overfed one. A comprehensive econometric modeling of an aggregated and two-staged food 
demand systems is carried out for one hundred-seventy-seven countries. The data is retrieved from 
the 2011 round of the World Bank International Comparison Program. In the first stage, the Florida 
preference independence model is applied to the main broad groups of goods and services. In the 
second stage, a conditional demand system for food subcategories is estimated using the Florida 
Slutsky model. An Inaccuracy measure and the Stroble decomposition are used in the outliers 
detection procedure The system equations are corrected for both groupwise and scale 
heteroskedasticity. The iterated nonlinear seemingly unrelated regression (ITNLSUR) is applied in the 
final estimation, while the iterated nonlinear least squares (ITNLLS) produces the initial values. The 
gauss-newton method is used to approximate the maximums of the objective functions. Expenditures 
elasticities, Slutsky own price elasticities, Frisch own price elasticities and Cournot own price elasticities 
constitute the estimate of the elasticities structure. Expenditure and marginal expenditure shares are 
the most valued direct outcome of the models. In a perfect allocation system food marginal shares 
would be equal for every country. The discrepancies shown are an indicator of the market distortion. 
A redistribution towards poorer countries would increase total utility. Even if a pareto optimum is in 
place in every economy (normally it is not), the solution captured by the model seems to be far from 
a global optimum. It is of upmost importance to know what are the implications on the real income of 
the poor if ecological thresholds are put in place through a market based mechanism. The Cournot 
elasticity estimates make evident that the poorer countries have more elastic demand curves, resulting 
primarily from the impact of increasing prices on real income, since there are no substitutes for food. 
This means that in an unequal market economy, if market based instruments are used to reduce the 
ecological degradation caused by food production, the poor will reduce consumption by a much 
greater percentage than the rich in response to price increases. Since the rich are responsible for far 
more ecological degradation than the poor, this outcome is highly perverse. This distortion is 
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Since the mid-1970s, the global economy has been dominated by three trends: the spread of capitalist 
market economies (Frieden, 2006); growing economic inequality (Piketty, 2014); and increasing 
ecological degradation driven by economic activity (Rockström et al., 2009; W. Steffen, Grinevald, 
Crutzen, & McNeill, 2011). 
The spread of capitalism has been widely praised and strenuously promoted by national governments, 
trade organizations, international organizations (in particular, the IMF and World Bank), free trade 
agreements, academia, and others. Academics have provided strong theoretical justifications for 
markets. The dominant theories claim that in a free market economy, the decentralized, utility-
maximizing decisions of producers and consumers drive the economy towards an economic 
equilibrium in which it would be impossible to make anyone better off without harming others, a 
condition known as Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality. This outcome is based on the realistic 
assumption that Individuals experience diminishing marginal utility, and the more questionable 
assumption that they maximize their own subjective utility within a budget constraint by allocating 
their income so that the last dollar spent on any good or service provides the same marginal utility 
(Akerlof & Shiller, 2015; Keen, 2011; Thaler, 2015). Based on decentralized information and free 
choice, the market supposedly allocates factors of production to those products with the greatest 
value, then apportions those products to those who value them most, as measured by willingness to 
pay (Hayek, 1945). If we accept willingness to pay as an objective measure of utility received, and if all 
consumers in a competitive market economy pay the same price for a given commodity, then markets 
will equalize marginal utility per dollar spent across all consumers, thus maximizing total utility as well.  
Unfortunately, market optimality, in theory and practice, is seriously undermined by both inequality 
and environmental degradation. 
Inequality was long ignored by neoclassical economists. Many early economists recognized that if 
individuals experience diminishing marginal utility, then rich people presumably experience lower 
marginal utility from consumption than the poor, suggesting that redistributing income from the rich 
to the poor would increase total utility (Marshall, 1890; Pigou, 1932). However, at the turn of the 20th 
century, Vilfredo Pareto, for whom the market outcome of Pareto efficiency is named, argued that it 
is not possible to meaningfully quantify utility, or compare the utility experienced by different 
individuals, who experience pleasure and pain in different ways. One cannot therefore claim that 
redistribution would improve utility, and economists should not be concerned with inequality (Pareto, 
1971). During the 1960s, when Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz entered the field, he found that “most 
[economists] were unconcerned about inequality; the dominant school worshiped at the feet of (a 
misunderstood) Adam Smith, at the miracle of the efficiency of the market economy.” At the time 
inequality in the US was at its nadir. Even after soaring inequality over the subsequent four decades, 
another Nobel laureate, Robert Lucas, could acknowledge the US current “staggering and 
unprecedented income inequality”, but also argue that we should pay it no mind, since free markets’ 
“limitless potential of increasing production” leads to “sustained, exponential growth in living 
standards”; in fact, he writes, “of the tendencies that are harmful to sound economics, the most 
seductive, and in my opinion the most poisonous, is to focus on questions of distribution.” (Lucas, 




Steadily increasing inequality however has forced economists to pay attention. The richest eight 
individuals in the world now control the same wealth as the poorest 3.75 billion (OXFAM, 2017). In the 
United States, the top 1% has captured over half the increase in GDP since the great recession (Saez, 
2016). Picketty’s (2014) bestselling Capital in the 21st Century argued not only that inequality was 
reaching levels not seen in centuries, but also that capitalism was the cause. In a capitalist economy, 
returns on capital generally exceed the growth rate of the economy as a whole, inevitably 
concentrating wealth in the hands of the few in the absence of government intervention. It is no longer 
plausible to argue that we cannot be certain that an additional $1.000 of income would improve utility 
more for a destitute person than a rich one. The only remaining justification for extreme inequality is 
that it increases economic growth, and that a larger pie will benefit everyone. However, there is also 
abundant evidence that relative wealth matters more than absolute wealth, and increasing income for 
the few makes reduces subjective utility for the many (Frank, 2005, 2007; Lane, 2001). Furthermore, 
compelling evidence shows that inequality contributes to a host of social and individual ills, ranging 
from homicide rates to obesity, and even the rich citizens of unequal countries may be worse off than 
lower income individuals in more equal ones (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). 
Ecological degradation may be the most serious of these trends. Human economic activities have 
reached a level that is bound to instigate irreversible change to the global environment, creating 
conditions likely to be less conducive to human development. The thresholds for climate change, 
biodiversity and the nitrogen cycle have already been exceeded and the thresholds for freshwater, 
land use change, ocean acidification and global phosphorous cycle are being approached (Rockström 
et al., 2009; Will Steffen et al., 2015). This presents serious challenges for market economies for several 
reasons.  First, economic growth is the main driver of ecological degradation. Not only can we no longer 
rely on continued growth to end poverty, we will likely need to reduce the physical size of the economy 
in order to return to the safe operating space for the global economy (Kallis, Kerschner, & Martinez-
Alier, 2012; Martinez-Alier, 2016; Wackernagel et al., 2002). Given finite resources created by nature, 
we must pay attention to their equitable distribution. Second, ecological degradation is destroying 
ecosystems services, most of which are non-excludable and/or non-rival. Markets are not viable for 
non-excludable resources, and are inefficient for non-rival ones (Farley & Costanza, 2010). Third, all 
economic production requires raw materials from nature, most of which alternatively serve as the 
structural building blocks of ecosystems, and energy, primarily fossil fuels. Removing ecosystem 
structure and emitting waste, particularly from fossil fuels, both degrade global ecosystem services. 
Since all economic production has negative impacts on others, all economic activities improve the 
welfare of some and leave others worse off, and Pareto efficiency is a meaningless criterion. 
1.1. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION 
This thesis will focus on an issue that illustrates the importance of these three trends: the allocation of 
food in a market economy. Food production poses one of the most serious threats to global 
ecosystems (Foley et al., 2011; Rockström et al., 2009; Tilman, Balzer, Hill, & Befort, 2011) but is 
essential for human wellbeing. Essential resources with limited possibilities for substitution exhibit 
highly price inelastic demand, meaning that demand is insensitive to changes in price, and a small 
decrease in supply will therefore lead to a large increase in price. The lower the share of the budget 
for which a resource accounts, the more inelastic the demand, which means that the rich are 




increasingly used as a conceptualized framework to tackle the latent incompatibility between 
economic activity and ecological thresholds (McCauley, 2006). Because markets weight preferences by 
purchasing power, market-based “solutions” are particularly problematic in a highly unequal world. If 
inequality is sufficiently great, purchasing power will have a greater impact on allocation than 
preferences. If we attempt to internalize the ecological costs of essential resources into their market 
prices, driving up price, the best case scenario is that the poor reduce consumption by more than the 
rich, even though the rich have been the primary drivers of ecological degradation. The worst case 
scenario is that the poor cannot purchase enough essential resources to survive, while the rich fail to 
even notice rising prices. This is precisely what happened when food prices soared in 2007-2008 
(Farley, Schmitt Filho, Burke, & Farr, 2015). 
While mainstream economists have historically argued that it is impossible to objectively compare 
marginal utility across individuals, this is not true for food consumption, which is a physiological need 
with scientifically measurable marginal benefits. Certainly, a malnourished person gains more utility 
from additional food than an overfed one. This thesis defines an economic demand curve as the 
marginal value of an essential commodity for any quantity consumed. The marginal value of essential 
resources becomes immeasurably large for an individual as the quantity consumed approaches the 
minimum required for survival. For food, this might be about 1200-1500 calories per day for an average 
female and male, respectively. Marginal value approaches zero as all physiological and psychological 
needs are satisfied, and arguably goes below zero as additional consumption makes people less 
healthy, above perhaps 3000-3500 calories per day for an active female and male, respectively. Since 
physiological needs for food are roughly similar for all groups of individuals, the aggregate economic 
demand curve is just the individual one scaled up. 
 In contrast, the individual’s market demand curve tells how much a consumer will buy of any given 
commodity at any given price, and is therefore a measure of consumer preferences weighted by 
purchasing power. The aggregate market demand curve is the sum of the individual curves.  In theory, 
markets allocate resources to their highest value uses, and as prices increase, markets will ensure that 
lowest value uses are eliminated first. For food, energy, and other essential resources, we can 
objectively state that the highest value use is satisfying basic needs, and the lowest value use is food 
waste. However, with an unequal distribution of wealth and income, markets will prioritize the 
preferences of the rich over those of the poor. With sufficiently unequal income, markets will allocate 
food to the rich who throw 30-40% in the garbage (Gunders, 2012; Gustavsson, J. Cederberg, Sonesson, 
Otterdijk, & Meybeck, 2011) rather than to the poor who need it to stave off malnutrition (FAO, IFAD, 
& WFP, 2015). For example, when food prices skyrocketed in the 2007-2008 and 2011-2012 food crises, 
consumption in the wealthiest countries was essentially unchanged, while it declined in the poorest 
countries (Farley, Schmitt Filho, Burke, & Farr, 2015). This empirical evidence reveals a fundamental 
and endogenous bias in the market resource allocation process. 
The commonly accepted aim of economics is the efficient allocation of resources, where ‘efficient’ 
implies utility maximizing.  It is widely acknowledged that market prices fail to reflect many ecological 
costs and benefits, leading to excessive ecological degradation. Among economists, the widely 
accepted solution is to ‘internalize’ ecological costs into market prices, which would dramatically 
increase the price of food. Before pursuing such an option, it is important to empirically examine how 




demand for food in different countries will allow us to determine by how much different populations 
will reduce food consumption in response to price increases, and hence evaluate the impact on food 
security. Furthermore, in spite of ecological limits to growth, endless economic growth remains a near 
universal goal among both politicians and economists, and is included in the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals. As people rise into the global middle class, they demand more grain fed animal 
protein. This not only threatens to worsen the ecological impacts of agriculture, it also increases the 
demand for staple grains, and hence their price. Unequal growth may make it more difficult for the 
basic needs of the poor to compete against the luxury preferences of the rich. Estimating the price and 
income elasticity of demand for different foods will allow us determine the impacts of unequal 
economic growth on food security. 
1.2. STUDY OBJECTIVES 
Is market allocation addressing the claims of wealthier consumers with an inherent minor marginal 
utility before poorer consumers with an inherent major marginal utility? If so, what are the 
fundamental factors behind that distortion? 
The thesis objective is to develop the market demand distortion concept and contribute to the ongoing 
debate over the inadequacies of market-based instruments on tackling the ecological thresholds issue. 
A comprehensive econometric modeling of a two staged aggregated and food demand systems will be 
carried out (Barnett & Serletis, 2008; Seale, Regmi, & Bernstein, 2003). The parametric demand 
modelling literature will be reviewed. The data will be retrieved from the 2011 rounds of the World 
Bank International Comparison Program. 
The market demand distortion is more obvious when the utility function is directly linked to a 
metabolic process strongly uncorrelated to cultural, anthropological, psychological or conceptual 
aspects. In this case the similarity of the individual utility functions is such that the optimum solution 





2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. TWO-STAGE BUDGETING 
Two-stage budgeting occurs when the consumer allocates the expenditure in two stages. At the first 
stage, the total expenditure is allocated to broad groups of goods and services. Here, each group 
expenditure depends on both the total expenditure and on some appropriate group price index. At the 
second stage, first stage group expenditures are further allocated to either individual or subgroups of 
goods and services. Second stage expenditures depend on both the group expenditure and on the 
prices within. These two allocations have to be made in such a way that guarantees a final result 
identical to an one step allocation with full information (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980). 
The second stage is intrinsically linked to the assumption of weak separability of preferences. (Henri 
Theil, 1980) named them blockwise dependent preferences. Under weak separability, preferences 
within a group are independent of the quantities that are consumed elsewhere in other groups and 
therefore the substitutes and complements should be kept together. As a result, each group has a sub-
utility function dependent on its own expenditure and own individual prices or subgroups price 
indexes, specific group demand systems can be conceptualized and separately estimated with 
potential huge gains in terms of degrees of freedom and, at last, the global utility can be interpreted 
as a combination of the subsequent sub-utilities functions. Although there isn’t any restriction on price 
substitution within groups, the price substitution between groups is equal to all elements of the same 
group and so a group level Slutsky matrix can be calculated (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980). 
In the first stage, it is common to postulate strong or additive separability of preferences. (Henri Theil, 
1980) named it block independence. Under strong separability the utility function is a mere addition 
of the subsequent sub-utilities functions and the Slutsky matrix includes neither complements nor 
inferior goods and services. Despite its large restrictiveness, there are substantial gains in terms of 
degrees of freedom. Empirical evidence strongly disapproves its usage in low aggregated groups. Even 
in highly aggregated groups substantial care must be taken. In particular, close related goods should 
join the same group (Deaton & Muellbauer, 1980; Seale & Regmi, 2006). 
2.2. DEMAND MODELS 
In the first stage, the Florida Preference Independence model is used to estimate an aggregate demand 
system over nine categories of goods and services: food, beverages and tobacco; clothing and 
footwear; education; gross rent and fuel; house furnishings and operations; medical care; transport 
and communications; recreation; other expenditures. In the second stage, the Florida Slutsky model is 
used instead to estimate a food demand system over eight food sub-categories: bread and cereals; 
meat; fish; dairy products; oils and fats; fruits and vegetables; beverages and tobacco; other food 
products. 
The Florida Slutsky model is an extension of Working’s model and the Florida Preference Independence 
model is a particular case of the Florida Slutsky model (Muhammad, Meade, Regmi, & Seale, 2011; 
Seale & Regmi, 2006; Henri Theil, 1980; Henry Theil, Chung, & L. Seale, 1989; Henry Theil, Suhm, & 
Meisner, 1981; Working, 1943). 
Both demand models assume constant tastes across countries. The impact of this restriction should be 




international tastes fluctuations (Reimer & Hertel, 2004). 
2.2.1. Working’s model 
The Working’s model was first applied to the analysis of U.S. household expenditure data in the 
1930’s. The model main assumption is that each household faces the same price vector so that the 
quantity demanded only depends on expenditure (Working, 1943).The Working’s model can be 
expressed as follows, 
 =  + . 	
.  +           = 1, … ,     (1) 
 =   is the budget share of good i, Ei = pi. qi is the expenditure on good i and  =  ∑ .   is 
the total consumption expenditure, pi is the price of good i, qi is the quantity of good i, and  is a 
residual term. 
The following additivity constraints are met, ∑  = 1  and ∑  = 0     (2) 
Let us multiply both sides of equation (1) by total expenditure, 
 = .  + . "	
.     (3) 
Then differentiate equation (3) with respect to E, 
$ = %% =  + . "	
 +     (4) 
$ = %% =  +     (5) $ is the marginal share of good i. It measures the increase in expenditure on good i induced by a 
unitary increase in total expenditure, ceteris paribus. Income elasticities are simply the product of  ((   and  or the ratio between the marginal share and the budget share of good i, that is, $ = %%  .  = 1 +     (6) 
Through equation (6) good i is a luxury good if  > 0 as its income elasticity is greater than unity. On 
the other hand, good i is a necessity if  < 0 as its income elasticity is less than unity. If  = 0, good 
i has a unitary elasticity. 
2.2.2. Florida Slutsky model 
In international cross countries demand analysis, the price vector varies freely. As Working’s model 
presupposes the same price vector, (Henry Theil et al., 1989) augmented it by assuming prices as 
explanatory variables. 
Following (Henry Theil et al., 1989), let , - be the budget share of good i at the geometric mean price ./ , for  = 1, … , , and at the observed real expenditure per capita of country c (0-), where c 
represents the countries (- = 1, … , 1). Accordingly, the equation (1) is modified as follows, 
2- =  + . 	
0- + -    (7) 





- =  + . 	
0- + (- − .-5 ) + -    (8) 
Where (- − 2-) represents the variation in the budget share of good i as the price vector changes 
from ̅ to -.The Florida Slutsky model introduces it through total differentiation. 
Hence, differentiate  = 8.9  :;   = <(=>?8@=>?9A=>?) , % = . %(	
) + . %(log) − . %(	
)   (9) 
A change in the budget share can be subdivided in a price, a quantity and an income component.  Add 
and subtract . %(	
F) to the right-hand side of equation (9) and obtain: 
% = . (%(	
) − %(	
F)) + %(	
) − . G%(	
) − %(	
F)H   (10) 
Where %(	
F) is the Divisia price index, 
%(	
F) = I . %(	







F) in equation (10) by %(	
0) 
which is the Divisia volume index, 
%(	
0) = I . %(	
)     (12) 
The term . %(	
) is the dependent variable of the general differential demand equation that 
defines the Rotterdam demand model (Henry Theil et al., 1989), 
. %(	
) = J. %(	
0) + I KLMN %(	
L)    (13) 
Where the KL is the Slutsky price coefficient and J is the marginal share, 
KL = O(, P)OL + O(, P)OP . L(, P)    (14) 
Where (, P) and L(, P) are the Walrasian demand functions of good i and j respectively and P is 
wealth. 
The Slutsky matrix QKLR corresponds to the Hessian of the expenditure function <(, S)  relative to 
prices or alternatively to the Jacobian matrix of the Hicksian demand function vector. Its elements are 
compensated price effects (Mas-Colell, Whinston, & Green, 2006). 
If the neoclassical rational preferences axioms hold, the Walrasian demand functions would be 
continuous, differentiable, homogeneous of degree zero, observing the Walras law, and having a 
symmetric and negative semidefinite Slutsky matrix QKLR of rank n-1. The negative semidefiniteness 
implies that the elements of the diagonal, the compensated own price effects, are nonpositive. The 





In the Florida Slutsky Model both the Slutsky symmetry property, KL = KL and the demand 
homogeneity property, ∑ KL = 0MN T	U  = 1, … ,  are imposed. Meanwhile, the additivity 
constraints also imply that ∑ KL = 0N T	U L = 1, … , . 
We can express equation (13) in terms of equation (8), 
% = . Q%(	
) − %(	
F)R + $. %(	
0) + I KL. %(	
L) − . %(	
0)    (15)MN  
As real income is fixed at Qc, %(	
0) is null, 
% = . Q%(	
) − %(	
F)R + I KL. %(	
L)    (16)MN  
Replace  with the initial  + . 	
0-, the budget share of good i at the geometric mean price ./  
and interpret %(	
) as the difference between 	
- and 	
./ = V ∑ 	
-VWN , the log of the 
geometric mean price of the good i. By applying the mean value theorem of calculus, we can now 
substitute equation (16) into equation (8) and obtain the Florida-Slutsky model, 
- =  + . - + ( + . -). {	
 -̅ − I(L + L. -). 	





 L-Y/+ -    (17) 
Where - = 	
0-. 
The Florida Slutsky model has a linear real income term, a quadratic pure price term, and a linear 
substitution term. The parameters are ,  and KL. 
It is applied to estimate the food and nonalcoholic beverages conditional demand system in the second 
stage under assumption of weak separability of preferences. 
2.2.3. Florida Preference Independence model 
The Florida Preference Independence (PI) Model assumes preferences independence. Under strong 
separability or additivity of preferences, the utility function corresponds to the addition of the n goods 
sub-utility functions. The marginal utility of good i is independent from the quantity of good j and so 
the Hessian of the utility function and its inverse are both diagonal matrices. 
The marginal budget shares are given by 
JL = (μ. . μL. L)\.      (18) 
Where μL is the term (i,j) of the Hessian of the utility function,  is the total expenditure and \ is the 




\A = O]μOP] OμOPP
^     (19) 
As the Walras law is supposed to hold, income and expenditure are used here interchangeably. The 
estimation procedure uses also actual expenditures. 
In the Florida PI Model, the elements of the Slutsky matrix can be expressed as follows: 
KL = \. (JL − J. JL)    (20). 
Since the Hessian of the utility function QμLR is diagonal, the matrix QJLR of the marginal budget shares 
is also diagonal. We can rewrite (20) as follows: 
KL = \. J. (1 − J) ;   = L  KL = −\. J. JL;   ≠ L    (21). 
From (21) we conclude that complements are not possible and that for the negative semidefiniteness 
of the Slutsky matrix to hold \ must be negative. 
Thus, the Florida Slutsky model can be simplified to 
- =  + . - + ( + . -). {	
 8W8̅ − ∑ (L + L. -). 	
 8MW8abbbb } + \. J. 	
 8W8̅ −MN\. J. ∑ JLMN . 	
 8MW8abbbb + -    (22). 
(Henry Theil et al., 1989) demonstrate that 
J- =  + . c -    (23) 
Where c- = (1 + -). 
The simplification of the Florida Slutsky model leads us to the Florida PI model 
- =  + . - + ( + . -). {	
 8W8̅ − ∑ (L + L. -). 	
 8MW8abbbb } +MN ∅. (( +. c -). {	
 8W8ebbb − ∑ (L + L. cfN -). 	
 8MW8̅M } + -    (24). 
The Florida PI model has a linear real income term, a quadratic pure price term, and a cubic substitution 
term. The parameters are each  and  plus ∅. 
The Florida PI model is applied to estimate the broad categories demand system of the first stage. 
Despite the assumption of strong separability being very restrictive, it decreases substantially the 
number of parameters delivering a solution with more degrees of freedom. Nevertheless, note that in 
a clear partition between essential and non-essential resources the strong separability is totally 
inappropriate because the greatest role non-essentials can have is to be complements of essentials 
and under strong separability complementarity is not possible. While the marginal utilities of essentials 
have an existence on their own the marginal utilities of non-essentials are inexistent if the adequate 




2.2.4. First stage expenditure and price elasticities 
The first stage (aggregate) expenditure and price elasticities are calculated through the Florida PI 
model. 




- = 1 + 
2
-    (25) 
Where g refers to the first stage group. 
Three own price elasticities are calculated: 
The Frisch own price elasticity presupposes that changes in prices are compensated to ensure a 
constant marginal utility of income, 
ℱ
- = \. J
-2
- = \. i1 + 
2
-j = \. Ƞ
-    (26) 
The Slutsky (compensated) own price elasticity presupposes that changes in prices are compensated 
to ensure a constant real income, 
k
- = \. (2
- + 
). (1 − 2
- − 
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- − 
)    (27) 
The Cournot (uncompensated) own price elasticity comes as follows, 
l
- = \. (2
- + 
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The Cournot elasticity is the most relevant to real-world consumers, who are rarely guaranteed a 
constant real income or constant marginal utility of income in response to price changes.   
2.2.5. Second stage expenditure and price elasticities 
The second stage disaggregated conditional expenditure and price elasticities are calculated through 
the Florida Slutsky model.  Conditional expenditures assume that the expenditure allocated to a block 
(aggregated group) will be reallocated among commodities within the block in response to a price 
change within those commodities. 
The unconditional expenditure and price elasticities are computed combining first and second stage 
expenditure and price elasticities. Unconditional expenditures assume that consumers will reallocate 
expenditures across blocks. 
The conditional expenditure elasticities are calculated as follows, 
Ƞm- = J.-m2.-m = 1 + .m2.-m     (29) 
The unconditional expenditure elasticities are computed as the product of (25) and (29), 
Ƞn- = Ƞ
-. Ƞm-     ℇ 
    (30) 
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    (31) 
The unconditional Frisch own price elasticity is, 
ℱn- = \. Ƞn-    (32) 
The conditional Slutsky own price elasticity is calculated as, 
km- = K..p2.-m     (33) 
The unconditional Slutsky own price elasticity is, 
kn- = \. Ƞm-. Ƞm- 2.-m2
- . (1 − Ƞ
-. 2
-) + K..p2.-m      ℇ 
    (34) 
The conditional Cournot own price elasticity is, 
lm- = K..p2.-m − 2.-m = km- − 2.-m     (35) 
In turn, the unconditional Cournot own price elasticity comes as follows, 
ln- = kn- − Ƞm-. 2.-m . Ƞ
-. 2
-     ℇ 
    (36) 
2.3. ECONOMETRICS 
2.3.1. Estimation methods 
2.3.1.1. General Nonlinear Simultaneous Equations model 
(SAS, 2014) notation is nearly followed throughout the econometric literature review. 
The nonlinear model specification can be written as 
ɛrs = r(Prs , trs , ɵr) ṽs = x(trs) y	U 	z;.    { = 1, … ,     (37). 
The disturbance vector ɛrs ℇ ʀ?, where 
 is the system equations number, has the following general 
properties: 
1. (ɛrs) = 0}    (38) 
2. (ɛrs. ɛrs~ ) = }    (39). 
The r ℇ ʀ? is a real function vector of Prs  ℇ ʀ?, trs  ℇ ʀ= and ɵr ℇ ʀ8, where  is the number of exogenous 
variables and  is the number of parameters. 
The ṽs ℇ ʀis a vector of instruments. 
The (
t




In the general simultaneous equations models, there is reverse causation and the disturbance vector ɛrs  ℇ ʀ? is correlated with the right-hand side endogenous variables Prs  ℇ ʀ?. The violation of the 
respective Gauss-Markov assumption1 produces biased Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) estimators (Kennedy, 
2008). 
2.3.1.1. Nonlinear Linear Least Squares (NLLS) 
The NLLS can be applied If the structural equations obey the Gauss-Markov theorem conditions, the 
model function is smooth and the objective function Hessian is positive definite somewhere (local 
minimum) in the unknown parameters space. In case the disturbances density is gaussian, the NLLS 
coincides with the maximum likelihood estimator. In other cases, the NLLS is consistent and converges 
asymptotically to a gaussian distribution (Amemiya, 1985). 
The iterated version of the NLLS (ITNLLS) iterates the estimation of } (k). The applied minimization 
method algorithm stops estimation when both parameters and k convergence criteria are 
simultaneously met (SAS, 2014). 
The NLLS estimates ɵr are achieved by minimizing the following objective function: 
k = Ũ~. Ũ/    (43) 
Where Ũ ℇ ʀ.? is a vector of residuals for the g equations stacked together. 
The ITNLLS objective function is: 
k = Ũ~. G%:
(k)A ⊗ H. Ũ/    (44) 
Where  ℇ ʀ is an identity matrix, k is a (
t
) matrix that estimates }, ⊗ is the Kronecker product 
and  is an (t) identity matrix. 
The NLLS and ITNLLS (t) variance-covariance matrix of ɵr comes as follows: 
ẟɵr = G} ~. (%:
(k)A ⊗ H. })A    (45) 
Where } is an (
t) matrix of residuals partial derivatives with respect to the parameters. 
 
2.3.1.2. Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (NLSUR) 
If each structural equation obeys the Gauss-Markov theorem conditions and equation disturbances 
are not independent from each other, the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) can be applied 
instead of OLS. 
The SUR method consists in estimating by OLS the } matrix and then apply to the full system the Joint 
Feasible Generalized Least Squares (JFGLS). Bear in mind that the efficiency gain relative to OLS is only 
                                                            
1 In the Classical Regression Model (CRM) the Gauss-Markov theorem assumptions hold and the OLS is 
therefore the best linear unbiased estimator. In the simultaneous equations model at least one endogenous 
variable is an independent variable that cannot be considered fixed in repeated samples, violating assumption 
four of the CRM and biasing the OLS estimator. In the nonlinear case, the simultaneous bias is apparent whenever 
the Jacobian of the disturbances relative to the parameters are not independent from at least one endogenous 




materialized if the sample is large (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1998). 
The NLSUR and SUR are alike. The NLSUR uses the Nonlinear Least Squares (NLLS) and the Nonlinear 
Joint Feasible Generalized Least Squares (NLJFGLS) to estimate the } matrix and then the system global 
equation which is formed by stacking together all equations. 
The Iterated Nonlinear Least Squares (ITNLLS) iterates the estimation of } (k), applying the NLJFGLS 
until it converges.   
The NLSUR estimates ɵr are achieved by minimizing the following objective function: 
k = Ũ~. GkVA ⊗ H. Ũ/    (46) 
Where 1""k refers to the Nonlinear Least Squares estimator. 
The ITNLSUR objective function is: 
k = Ũ~. GkA ⊗ H. Ũ/    (47) 
 
The NLSUR and ITNLSUR (t) variance-covariance matrix of ɵr comes as follows: 
ẟɵr = G} ~. (kA ⊗ H. })A    (48) 
 
2.3.1.3. Nonlinear Two Stage Least Squares (NL2SLS) 
The Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimator is a single equation estimation method. 
The Theil’s interpretation of the 2SLS estimator split the procedure as follows (Dhrymes, 1994): 
1. Undertake an OLS regression to each right-hand side endogenous variable in the equation on 
the available instrumental variables. To the instrumental set of variables should belong all 
exogenous variables in the simultaneous equation model and other hypothetical variables 
which are uncorrelated with the disturbance vector ɛrs ℇ ʀ? and highly correlated with each 
endogenous variable. Compute the estimated values for each of these endogenous variables. 
2. In the relevant equation, replace each endogenous right-hand side variable by its first stage 
estimated values and proceed to the second stage OLS estimation of the entire equation. 
In the NL2SLS, it is the first derivatives of the model with respect to the parameters that are replaced 
with estimated values. (Amemiya, 1985) called it the Best Nonlinear Two Stage Least Squares (BNL2S). 
In this matter, it can be said that the 2SLS is no more than a special case of the general approach 
embedded in the NL2SLS. 
The iterated version of the NL2SLS (ITNL2SLS) encompasses the iterated estimation of } (k). Here the 
applied minimization method algorithm stops estimation when both parameters and k convergence 
criteria are simultaneously met (SAS, 2014). 
The NL2SLS is biased in finite samples, but consistent in large samples. Its asymptotical efficiency is 
dependent on the spherical quality of the disturbances ɛ?s (homoskedasticity and inexistence of 
autocorrelation). The NL2SLS gaussian asymptotical distribution is not coincidental with the maximum 




The NL2SLS estimates ɵr are computed by minimizing the following objective function: 
k = Ũ~. G ⊗ , H. Ũ    (49) 
Where: 
• , = x}. (x}~. x})A. x}~ is the (t) projection matrix; 
• x} is an (t) matrix of instrumental variables; 
The ITNL2SLS objective function to be minimized is: 
k = Ũ~. G%:
(k)A ⊗ , H. Ũ     (50) 
The NL2SLS and the ITNL2SLS (t) variance-covariance matrix of ɵr comes as follows: 
ẟɵr = (}~. (%:
(k)A ⊗ , ). })A    (51) 
 
2.3.1.4. Nonlinear Three Stage Least Squares (NL3SLS) 
The Three Stage Least Squares (3SLS) is a system estimation method as two or more equations are 
jointly estimated. It uses the actual correlation among the disturbances across equations to produce 
more precise parameter estimates. It has the inconveniences of requiring more data and being more 
sensitive to model specification errors. 
The 3SLS estimator procedure can be split as follows (Kennedy, 2008): 
1. Apply the 2SLS to estimate the equations; 
2. Use the 2SLS structural equations residuals to estimate }, the variance-covariance matrix 
across equations; 
3. Apply the SUR estimator to the transformed system, that is, the JFGLS to the transformed 
global equation using the 2SLS estimate for }. In the transformed system each right-hand 
endogenous variable is replaced by its 2SLS first stage estimated values. 
In the NL3SLS, NL2SLS and NLSUR are used instead of 2SLS and SUR (Amemiya, 1985). As with the 
NL2SLS, the NL3SLS is a general approach encompassing the 3SLS. 
In the NL3SLS, it is the first derivatives of the model with respect to the parameters that are replaced 
with estimated values. (Amemiya, 1985) called it the Best Nonlinear Three Stage Least Squares 
(BNL3S).  
The iterated version of the NL3SLS (ITNL3SLS) encompasses iterated estimation of } (k). In the third 
stage, the Iterated Nonlinear Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITNLSUR) is applied. As for the 
ITNL2SLS, the applied minimization method algorithm stops estimation when both parameters and k 
convergence criteria are simultaneously met (SAS, 2014). 
Although the NL3SLS is biased in finite samples, it is both consistent and asymptotically more efficient 
than NL2SLS. Its asymptotical efficiency is dependent on the spherical quality of the disturbances ɛ?s 
(homoskedasticity and inexistence of autocorrelation). As for the NL2SLS, the NL3SLS gaussian 
asymptotical distribution does not depend on the disturbances density. This robustness is very 




The NL3SLS estimates ɵr are computed by minimizing the following objective function: 
k = Ũ~. GkV]A ⊗ , H. Ũ    (52) 
The ITNL3SLS objective function to be minimized is: 
k = Ũ~. GkA ⊗ , H. Ũ     (53) 
The NL3SLS and the ITNL3SLS (t) variance-covariance matrix of ɵr comes as follows: 
ẟɵr = (}~. (kA ⊗ , ). })A    (54) 
2.3.1.5. Nonlinear Full Information Maximum Likelihood (NLFIML) 
The NLFIML is considered a system estimation method because all equations are jointly estimated. The 
NLFIML assumes that the disturbances vector ɛrs ℇ ʀ? follows a multivariate normal density with (ɛrs) = 0}  and (ɛrs . ɛrs~ ) = } that is full characterized by the ɵr ℇ ʀ8 and r]ℇ ʀ? parameters vectors. 
As the r]ℇ ʀ? can be expressed as a function of ɵr ℇ ʀ8, a concentrated multivariate normal density is 
used. The NLFIML consists in estimating the ɵr ℇ ʀ8 that maximizes the concentrated likelihood 
function over the parameter space Θ l ʀ8. The concentrated likelihood function is the joint normal 
density of ɛrs ℇ ʀ? expressed as a function of ɵr ℇ ʀ8 and }(ɵr). Due to computational convenience, the 
log likelihood function is normally used in the estimation procedure (Amemiya, 1985; SAS, 2014). 
The NLFIML just guarantees that the estimates upon convergence correspond to a likelihood function 
local maximum. It ensures the global maximum only if the likelihood function is strictly concave 
(Amemiya, 1985; Dhrymes, 1994). 
The NLFIML estimates of ɵr and r] are computed by maximizing the following likelihood function: 
(ɵr, r]) = − . 
2 . "(2K) + I " Or(Prs , trs , ɵr)OPrs~ 

sN − 2 . "G}(r]) H− 12 . U  }(r])A. I r(Prs, trs, ɵr). r~

sN (Prs , trs , ɵr)    (55) 
Where the straight vertical parenthesis and the U function represent the determinant and the trace 
of the argument matrix respectively. 
The }(ɵr) variance-covariance matrix across equations can be expressed as follows: 
}(ɵr) = 1 . I r(Prs , trs , ɵr). r~

sN (Prs , trs , ɵr)    (56) 
The concentrated log likelihood function is reached using }(ɵr) instead of }(r]) in equation (48): 
(ɵr) = − . 
2 . G1 + "(2K)H + I " Or(Prs, trs , ɵr)OPrs~ 

sN − 2 . "G}(ɵr) H    (57) 





The FIML (t) ɵr variance-covariance matrix estimator is (Wooldridge, 2002): 
ẟɵr = G−,ɵr HA    (58) 
Where ,ɵr  is the Hessian of the concentrated log likelihood function. 
,ɵr = O](ɵr)Oɵr. Oɵr~     (59) 
As the expected Hessian when evaluated at the true parameters values is equal to the symmetric of 
the expected gradient vector outer product, another estimator can be used: 
ẟɵr = (;̃ɵr . ;̃ɵr ~)A    (60) 
Where ;̃ɵr  is the gradient vector of the concentrated log likelihood function. 
;̃ɵr = O(ɵr)Oɵr     (61) 
If the ɛrs have a jointly normal density, the NLFIML is consistent, asymptotically normal and has a 
smaller variance-covariance matrix than NL3SLS. However, if not the case, the NLFIML is generally not 
consistent (Amemiya, 1985). 
To test for the normality of the disturbances, a Shapiro-Wilk test (Shapiro & Wilk, 1965) is carried out 
for each equation: 
	: s~1(0, ])    (62) 1: 1	{ 	    (63) 
After sorting the equation residuals U in ascending order, the following test statistic is computed: 
 = z]∑ (U − U̅)]N     (64) 
z = I :. (UA@ − U)
]
N  T  ; <<    (65) 
z = I :. (UA@ − U)
]
N  T  ; 	%%    (66) <L<-{  T > <  WsW=     (67) 
Where :  and WsW= are tabulated and if n is odd the median observation is dropped. 
2.3.2. Minimization methods 
The nonlinear optimization methods can be subdivided in local and global methods. Local methods 
just guarantee local optimization. Although global methods such as simulating annealing or genetic 
algorithms can reach the global optimum, their huge computation effort reinforces the local methods 




The class of gradient based algorithms is a class of local optimization methods. It can be synthesized 
by the following expression: 
ɵr = ɵrA − ȠA. rA    {ℎ    rA = }A. ;̃A    (68) 
Where k represents actual iteration, Ƞ the step size, r the (t1) direction vector, } the (t) scaling 
and rotation matrix and ;̃ the (t1) objective function gradient vector. 
As the objective functions, kin least squares and −(ɵr) in maximum likelihood, are meant to 
decrease in each iteration, the scaling and rotation matrix }  ought to be positive definite. 
The gradient based algorithms differ from one another in the specific choices that are made on the 
step size Ƞ and the scaling and rotation matrix }. 
2.3.2.1. Newton method 
In the Newton method, ȠA and }A are defined as follows (Amemiya, 1985; Nelles, 2001; 
Wooldridge, 2002): 
}A = ,AA     (69) ȠA = 1    (70) 
Where ,A is the objective function Hessian relative to vector parameter ɵrA. 
Setting the step size to one is the optimal choice for a linear optimization problem that just requires 
one iteration to reach the solution. It is a direct consequence of the second order Taylor expansion of 
the objective function. However, in a nonlinear problem it is not generally possible to reach the 
solution in a single iteration. As a fixed step size here can be too small or too large, it is therefore 
common to use a line search in each iteration. Its aim is to find the optimal step size ȠA that 
minimizes the objective function in the direction of rA. (Nelles, 2001). 
The Newton method requires at each iteration the computation of the objective function second 
derivatives relative to the parameters and the subsequent inversion of the Hessian, restricting its 
application to simple problems with low computational effort. Another non-neglectable drawback is 
the fact that in each iteration the objective function decreases only if the Hessian ,Ais positive 
definite. In the optimum neighborhood that is always true. However, in the first iterations it can easily 
fail (Nelles, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002). 
2.3.2.2. Gauss-Newton method 
The Gauss-Newton method , an adaptation of the general Newton method, was especially designed to 
calculate the nonlinear least squares estimator (Amemiya, 1985; Nelles, 2001). 
In the nonlinear least squares minimization problem the objective function gradient and Hessian 
relative to the parameters can be expressed as follows (Nelles, 2001): 
;̃A = 2.  A~ . 0}UA(Prs , trs , ɵr)    (71) 
Where  A is the (
t) Jacobian Matrix of the model residuals relative to the parameters and 0}UAis the (




k9 = I UA,(Prs , trs , ɵr). },A.?N     (73) 
Where UA, is the ith element of the 0}UAvector and },Ais the (t) ith residual Hessian relative 
to the parameters both evaluated at iteration  − 1. 
In the Gauss-Newton method the residuals UA,(Prs , trs, ɵr) are assumed to be small and therefore it 
neglects the k9matrix when setting the scaling and rotation matrix }A: ;̃A =  A~ . 0}UA(Prs , trs, ɵr)    (74) }A = ( A~ .  A)A    (75) ȠA = 1    (76) ɵr = ɵrA − ȠA. rA    {ℎ    rA = ( A~ .  A)A.  A~ . 0}UA(Prs , trs, ɵr)    (77) 
As the scale and direction remain equivalent, the factor 2 is dropped in (74) and (75). 
As long as k9 → 0, the Gauss-Newton method has the same properties of the general Newton method 
without demanding the computation of second derivatives. The classical version sets the step size ȠA to 1. However, it is common to perform a line search at each iteration to optimize the step size ȠA (Amemiya, 1985; Nelles, 2001). 
2.3.2.3. Levenberg-Marquardt method 
The Gauss-Newton method cannot be applied if the matrix  A~ .  Ain (77) is singular or ill 
conditioned. The smaller the least eigen value of  A~ .  A is, the worse is the convergence rate 
(Nelles, 2001). 
The Levenberg-Marquardt method overcomes the problems associated with an ill conditioned  A~ .  A matrix, modifying the equation (77) as follows: 
ɵr = ɵrA − ȠA. rA    {ℎ    rA = G A~ .  A. A. 8HA.  A~ . 0}UA(Prs , trs , ɵr)    (78) 
Where 8 is a (t) identity matrix. 
The Gauss-Newton method second order approximation is powerful when close to the optimum and 
a small Ashould be adequate. However, when far from the optimum the convergence of the Gauss-
Newton method may not occur and a larger A should be chosen to guarantee a positive definite 
scale and rotation matrix }A and a descent direction for the objective function. 
Initially a positive value for A should be chosen. At each further iteration, A normally decreases 
as the optimum is bound to be approached. However, even in further iterations and whenever a 
downhill direction is not achievable A will always increase. (Nelles, 2001). 
2.3.3. Outliers detection in cross-country demand analysis 
The information inaccuracy measure and the Stroble decomposition can be used to detect outliers in 
a cross-country demand analysis (Henri Theil, 1996). The formulation is as follows: 
W = I ,WN      ; : -	;S¢{	 




,W =  £,W − ,W + ,W . "	
 ,W£,W    (80) W is the information inaccuracy measure, ,W is the (, -) Stroble component, ,W and £,W are 
respectively the actual and estimated expenditure share. 
If the fit is perfect and ,W is equal to £,W for every (, -), the information inaccuracy measure W is 
zero. As the fit precision decreases, the W increases. Since the estimated £,W can be negative in the 
Florida Models, sometimes the W cannot be calculated. In these cases, the Stroble component is 
replaced with a value that is indifferent in terms of outlier classification. 
2.3.4. Heteroskedasticity modeling 
The presence of heteroskedasticity has a negative and non-negligible impact on the asymptotic 
properties of the least squares estimators. It is therefore useful to perform statistical tests for 
heteroskedasticity and if it is the case to model and modify the estimation procedure accordingly 
(Greene, 2012). 
2.3.4.1. Statistical tests for heteroskedasticity 
In the Simultaneous Equations Model, a specific statistical test is undertaken for each equation. 
2.3.4.1.1. White’s general test 
¤: ] = ]  ∀    (81) : 1	{ ¤    (82) 
The test  is undertaken for each equation as follows (Greene, 2012; SAS, 2014; White, 1980): 
A. Regress the square of equation residuals U] on a constant and on every unique variable 
(column) contained in the (]t])   ⊗   matrix where the (t)   is the Jacobian of the 
residuals U  relative to the estimated parameters. In the linear simultaneous equations model 
the columns of   are constituted by all unique variables, by their squares and cross products. 
B. Compute the test statistic . ] in the regression of U]. Use the density under null, a Chi-
squared with ¢ − 1 degrees of freedom where ¢ is the number of parameters, and perform 
the test. 
The White’s test is general and very sensitive to model specification errors. In case the null is rejected, 
it does not deliver any clue about the actual form of the heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2012; White, 
1980). 
2.3.4.1.2. The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test 
] = ]. (¤ + r ~. x})  ∀    (83) ¤: r ~ = 0}    (84) : 1	{ ¤    (85) 




The test statistic is (Greene, 2012; SAS, 2014): 
"¦ = 1 . GŨ? − U̅? . 1}H~. x}. Gx}~. x}HA. x}~GŨ? − U̅?. 1}H    (86) 
Where Ũ?is the (t1) vector of square residuals, U̅? is the mean square residual, 1}  is a (t1) vector of 
ones, x} is a (t) matrix of independent variables observations and 
 = 1 . I U?,] − Ũ?~. Ũ? ]

N     (87) 
As the Breusch-Pagan test is sensitive to the assumption of normality of the original disturbance term, 
a more robust estimator  of the <?,]  is used to compute the Lagrange multiplier statistic. Under the 
null, the test statistic has a Chi-squared asymptotic density with  degrees of freedom. The Breusch-
Pagan test can be applied to various variance models (Greene, 2012). 
2.3.4.2. Heteroskedasticity model 
(Henry Theil et al., 1989) found group heteroskedasticity in their ICP cross-country demand analysis. 
The countries were divided in two groups. The first group included the countries that participated in 
phase II and phase III of the ICP and the second group the countries that didn’t participate in neither. 
Fitting the Florida PI model to each group separately, the estimated covariance matrix of the second 
group was almost two-fold larger than the estimated covariance matrix of the first group. 
Following (Seale & Regmi, 2006), three groups of heteroskedasticity were formed. The group I includes 
the countries that joined the ICP in the first three phases. The group III includes the countries that were 
added in 2011. The group II includes the remaining countries. 
 The final step is to evaluate the T-tests for the statistical significance of the variance parameterization. 
As in cross section econometric analysis the existence of scale heteroskedasticity is very often, the 
country per capita expenditure natural logarithm s  was introduced in the modeling. 
The heteroskedasticity model is: 
ɛrs = r(Prs , trs , ɵr)    (88) ɛrs = ,s. §s̃     (89) 
,s = ©̈©
ª«ℎs, ⋯ 0⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯ ¯ℎs,?°±
±²    (90) 
s,] = ]. (1 + ∅. ³1 + ∅]. ³2 + ∅´. s) + s, 
ℎs, = Gs,] HA    (91) §s̃  ~1G0}, }H    (92) ³1 and ³2 are dummy variables that address the group heteroskedasticity. 




NL3SLS the Nonlinear Feasible Generalized Least Squares (NLFGLS) is used instead of NLLS whenever 
applicable and a pseudolikelihood procedure is undertaken in the heteroskedasticity model estimation 
(SAS, 2014). 
In the NLFIML, the heteroskedasticity modeling changes the concentrated log likelihood function to: 
Gɵr, ∅,H = − . 
2 . G1 + "(2K)H + I " Or(Prs , trs, ɵr)OPrs~ 

sN








3. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON PROGRAM DATA 
The expenditure and price data are retrieved from 2011 round of the World Bank International 
Comparison Program (ICP). The ICP 2011 gathered 199 countries and its ultimate objective is to allow 
international comparisons for the different GDP components. As the national GDPs are computed in 
local currency prices, a conversion to a common unit must be made before a direct comparison can be 
undertaken. The use of exchange rates is not satisfactory. Two reasons assist here. Firstly, the non-
traded goods and services are not taken-into-account. Most construction, government and market 
services for instance do not act on the international trade stage. As non-traded goods and services 
prices are normally higher in high income economies, this distortion is bound to lead to the 
overestimation of the gap between low-income and high-income countries. Secondly, exchange rates 
are susceptible of being influenced by erratic short-term capital flows such as speculation, interest 
rates and monetary policy, decoupling its pricing from medium term international trade economic 
fundamentals. To tackle these issues, the ICP delivers Purchasing Power Parities (PPPs). A PPP is equal 
to the local currency units needed to buy a specific basket of goods and services that can be exactly 
bought in the base country with just one unit of its currency. As the baskets used comprise non-traded 
goods and services, PPPs are supposed to be sounder currency converters than exchange rates. PPPs 
are first calculated for individual goods and services, and then for the various levels of aggregation up 
to GDP (International Comparison Program, 2011; World Bank, n.d.). 
PPPs are not comparable because they are denominated in national currencies. Comparing the price 
levels of two countries requires the conversion of PPPs to the same currency unit. Here, the ICP 
standardizes the PPPs into Price Level Indexes (PLIs) by dividing them by the U.S. dollar exchange rate. 
As we use them as research inputs, it is advisable to retain that PLIs changes are normally instigated 
by exchange rates fluctuations. Finally, the real expenditures per capita research inputs come from 
using PPPs to convert nominal into real expenditures (International Comparison Program, 2011). 
The ICP split GDP into 155 basic headings. Within each basic heading, individual product PPPs are 
calculated for each pair of countries. The ICP uses multilateral PPPs ensuring that direct and indirect 
computation via a base country produces the same result. Furthermore, a change in the group of 
countries included will induce a change in each pair PPP (International Comparison Program, 2011). 
There are several multilateral PPPs computational methods. The choice criteria focus on two main 
characteristics. Firstly, PPPs are transitive whenever the PPP between two countries does not change 
with the type of computation, either direct or indirect through a third country. Secondly, PPPs are base 
country invariant if the PPP between two countries is independent from the base country choice 
(International Comparison Program, 2011). 
From basic headings aggregation level on, the PPPs are weighted by expenditures. In each step two 
PPP are computed, first using the weights of the base country (Laspeyres index) and then using the 
weights of the other (Paasche index). The ICP takes the geometric mean of the two aggregated PPPs 
(Fisher index) to undertake the comparisons, allowing countries to be treated symmetrically. More 
precisely, the multilateral PPP is the geometric mean of the direct and indirect Fisher indexes. 
However, symmetry of treatment does not go with additivity. Indeed, the real expenditure computed 




aggregate (International Comparison Program, 2011).  
Ensuring the PPPs and real expenditures per capita are compatible throughout the first and the second 
stage demand systems estimation requires using and additive method. Thus, the Paasche PPPs are 
computed for the first stage. 
The ICP analytical categories that are aggregated in the first stage demand system are Food and 
nonalcoholic beverages; Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics; Clothing and footwear; Housing, 
water, electricity, gas and other fuels; Furnishings, household equipment and maintenance; Health; 
Transport; Communication; Recreation and culture; Education; Restaurants and hotels; Miscellaneous 
goods and services. 
In the second stage, the aggregation involves the twenty-nine ICP Food and Nonalcoholic Beverages 
basic headings. 




4. METHODOLOGIC FRAMEWORK 
The estimation general procedure encompasses an estimation method, the algorithm initial values and 
the minimization method used to approximate the minimum of the objective function. The Levenberg-
Marquardt method is used in case the Gauss Newton method fails to converge. 
The additivity constraint  ∑  = 1  implies that the cross equations covariance matrix is singular. To 
overcome this issue, one equation is dropped from estimation and their estimates are computed from 
the output given by the others. (A. P. Barten, 1969) proved that the estimates are invariant to the 
chosen equation. 
In the right side of the structural model equations there is not any dependent variable. Therefore, the 
NL2SLS and NL3SLS are not appropriate. 
When not explicitly mentioned, the level of significance of the statistical tests is 5%. 
The code was developed in SAS 9.4. 
 
The estimation of the two-stage demand system for food and non-alcoholic beverages from the ICP 
2011 data has the following methodologic steps: 
A. Choose the first stage broad categories of goods and services by aggregating the ICP analytical 
categories. Then choose the second stage subcategories of ICP Food and Non- alcoholic 
beverages analytical category by aggregating Food and Non- alcoholic beverages basic 
headings; 
B. Fit the Florida-PI model to the first stage aggregated data using the ITNLSUR. Take the ITNLLS 
to estimate the initial parameters values. Drop from the dataset those countries with an 
information inaccuracy measure greater than 0.1 (Seale & Regmi, 2006); 
C. Repeat the estimation procedure of the latter step without outliers in the dataset. Compute 
the mean of square residuals for each ICP joining date groups and across equations. Compare 
the results and decide about the final heteroskedastic group aggregation; 
D. Repeat the estimation procedure again including now the heteroskedasticity correction 
described in section 2.3.4.2 Heteroskedasticity model. Analyze the T-test of statistical 
significance of the estimated parameters and evaluate the goodness of the group and the scale 
heteroskedasticity model (SAS code in Annex III); 
E. Observe the empirical distributions of the residuals produced in the latter step and perform a 
Shapiro-Wilk test for the normality of the equations disturbances. In case the null is not 
rejected, fit the Florida-PI model to the first stage aggregated data without outliers using 
NLFIML. Take as initial values the estimates of the latter step. Include the heteroskedasticity 
model; 
F. Assume the same outliers and heteroskedastic model of first stage and fit the Florida Slutsky 
model to the second stage subcategories. Use the ITNLSUR, taking ITNLLS to estimate the initial 
parameters values. 
G. Observe the empirical distributions of the residuals produced in the latter step and perform a 
Shapiro-Wilk test for the normality of the equations disturbances. In case the null is not 
rejected, fit the Florida-Slutsky model to the second stage aggregated data without outliers 
using NLFIML. Take as initial values the estimates of the latter step and include the 
heteroskedasticity model; 
H. With first stage and second stage estimates compute the countries expenditure and price 




5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.1. FIRST STAGE AND SECOND STAGE AGGREGATION 
Table I shows the first stage aggregation: 
  
The joining of Transport and Communication into the 6th group is natural. The group 8th is made of 
luxury categories. The assumption of strong separability of preferences does not seem to be 
contradicted by any specific feature of the groups structure. 
As the second stage aggregation is undertaken under weak separability of preferences, the restrictions 
on grouping are minor. Table II shows the second stage groups: 
First stage group
1 1 Food and nonalcoholic beverages
2 3 Clothing and footwear
3 4 Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels





2 Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and narcotics
9 Recreation and culture
11 Restaurants and hotels









Group I is the most important: staple grains, plus sugar. While grains are primary source of nutrition 
for most people, sweetness is among the most universally preferred flavors (Reed & McDaniel, 2006). 
The ongoing debate over whether or not sugar is addictive (Avena, Rada, & Hoebel, 2008). is at the 
very least strong evidence that it exhibits highly price inelastic demand, and should therefore be 
grouped with staple grains. Group IV groups together dairy products and eggs, as well as oil, which was 
done because preliminary examination of the data suggested similar consumption patterns. 
5.2. OUTLIERS 
Table III shows the twenty-seven outliers that were detected (see section 2.3.3). 
Second stage group
1101111 Rice
1101112 Other cereals, flour and other products
1101181 Sugar
1101113 Bread
1101114 Other bakery products
1101115 Pasta products
1101121 Beef and veal
1101122 Pork
1101123 Lamb, mutton and goat
1101124 Poultry
1101125 Other meats and meat preparations
1101131 Fresh, chilled or frozen fish and seafood
1101132 Preserved or processed fish and seafood
1101141 Fresh milk
1101142 Preserved milk and other milk products
1101143 Cheese
1101144 Eggs and egg-based products
1101151 Butter and margarine
1101153 Other edible oils and fats
1101161 Fresh or chilled fruit
1101171 Fresh or chilled vegetables other than potatoes
1101172 Fresh or chilled potatoes
1101162
Frozen, preserved or processed fruit and fruit-based 
products
1101173
Frozen, preserved or processed vegetables and 
vegetable-based products
1101182 Jams, marmalades and honey
1101183 Confectionery, chocolate and ice cream
1101191 Food products nec
1101211 Coffee, tea and cocoa
1101221 Mineral waters, soft drinks, fruit and vegetable juices
Table II












I II III IV V VI VII
7 Cameroon 0.0025 0.0039 0.0797 0.0071 0.0143 0.0010 0.0143 0.1228
11 Comoros 0.0005 0.0748 0.0431 0.0046 0.0143 0.0143 0.0007 0.1522
15 Djibouti 0.0244 0.0209 0.0421 0.0005 0.0143 0.0135 0.0004 0.1159
16 Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.0211 0.0010 0.0376 0.0005 0.0070 0.0803 0.0002 0.1478
18 Ethiopia 0.0482 0.0001 0.0062 0.0089 0.0098 0.0143 0.0128 0.1003
20 Gambia, The 0.0015 0.0032 0.0891 0.0600 0.0294 0.0768 0.0057 0.2657
24 Kenya 0.0133 0.0374 0.0563 0.0000 0.0035 0.0043 0.0015 0.1164
25 Lesotho 0.0405 0.0253 0.0006 0.0121 0.0143 0.0059 0.0062 0.1049
26 Liberia 0.5615 0.0149 0.0208 0.0001 0.0143 0.0080 0.0233 0.6430
28 Malawi 0.0017 0.0514 0.0010 0.0112 0.0011 0.0011 0.0448 0.1124
40 Seychelles 0.0468 0.0000 0.0002 0.0005 0.0143 0.0472 0.0014 0.1105
41 Sierra Leone 0.0068 0.0046 0.0930 0.0227 0.0322 0.0210 0.0067 0.1870
56 Fiji 0.0000 0.0570 0.0136 0.0063 0.0032 0.0264 0.0019 0.1083
57
Hong Kong SAR, 
China
0.0034 0.0001 0.0053 0.0000 0.0002 0.2765 0.0002 0.2856
63 Maldives 0.0464 0.0143 0.0699 0.0009 0.0000 0.2023 0.0143 0.3481
72 Thailand 0.0011 0.0023 0.1790 0.0011 0.0001 0.0030 0.0036 0.1903
110 Malta 0.0007 0.0013 0.1114 0.0009 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.1146
112 Montenegro 0.0113 0.0222 0.0476 0.0059 0.0143 0.0001 0.0547 0.1561
119 Russian Federation 0.0053 0.0069 0.2930 0.0002 0.0004 0.0012 0.0143 0.3213
147 Aruba 0.0437 0.0006 0.0351 0.0002 0.0143 0.0019 0.0143 0.1101
148 Bahamas, The 0.0787 0.0037 0.0175 0.0012 0.0005 0.0052 0.0019 0.1087
149 Barbados 0.0249 0.0143 0.0462 0.0143 0.0143 0.0451 0.0143 0.1733
151 Bermuda 0.0008 0.0541 0.0099 0.0000 0.0109 0.0888 0.0005 0.1651
157 Montserrat 0.0160 0.0143 0.0001 0.0008 0.0645 0.0471 0.0143 0.1571
161 Sint Maarten 0.0678 0.0004 0.0383 0.0011 0.0038 0.0001 0.0143 0.1258
164
Turks and Caicos 
Islands
0.0987 0.0018 0.0584 0.0022 0.0080 0.0239 0.0067 0.1998







5.3. FIRST STAGE RESULTS 
 
The estimated αs, which are the United States budget shares at the countries price indexes geometric 
mean, compare quite well with the actual US budget shares. 
Needs are characterized by negative βs, and wants by positive ones. As expected, the first (food and 
nonalcoholic beverages) and the second (clothing and footwear) groups, which are formed mainly by 
needs, have negative estimated βs. The fourth (furnishings, household equipment and maintenance) 
and the seventh group (education) have estimated βs that are not statistically significant, indicating 
expenditure elasticities around unity. This is quite acceptable because both needs and wants can be 
found in the groups and they are less essential than the first and second groups. The third (housing, 
Approx
Pr > |t|
α1 0.0821 0.0062 13.16 <.0001
α2 0.0447 0.0021 21.59 <.0001
α3 0.2347 0.0073 32.21 <.0001
α4 0.0534 0.0020 26.92 <.0001
α5 0.0775 0.0074 10.52 <.0001
α6 0.1659 0.0048 34.28 <.0001
α7 0.0186 0.0031 6.01 <.0001
α8 0.3231 0.0078 41.71 <.0001
β1 -0.1332 0.0046 -28.98 <.0001
β2 -0.0031 0.0015 -2.06 0.0415
β3 0.0337 0.0051 6.66 <.0001
β4 0.0007 0.0015 0.51 0.6096
β5 0.0205 0.0055 3.74 0.0003
β6 0.0176 0.0036 4.9 <.0001
β7 -0.0016 0.0021 -0.78 0.4363
β8 0.0655 0.0046 14.31 <.0001
φ -0.9153 0.0279 -32.85 <.0001
h1 14.2997 0.3961 36.1 <.0001
h2 25.5463 1.1043 23.13 <.0001
h3 -6.7129 0.1555 -43.18 <.0001
ẟ1 0.0037 0.0000 105.84 <.0001
ẟ2 0.0034 0.0001 36.02 <.0001
ẟ3 0.0037 0.0000 90.56 <.0001
ẟ4 0.0036 0.0001 31.77 <.0001
ẟ5 0.0039 0.0000 96.73 <.0001
ẟ6 0.0037 0.0001 73.5 <.0001
ẟ7 0.0039 0.0002 24.65 <.0001
Table IV








water, electricity, gas and other fuels), the fifth (health), the sixth (transport and communication) and 
the eighth (a set of luxury items) groups have positive estimated βs. The initial units of housing, water 
and energy are obviously needs, not wants.  However, once basic needs are satisfied, all of these do 
become luxury goods. Excessively large homes, the energy required to power them, and drinking water 
used for swimming pools, lawns and flush toilets are clearly not physiological needs. Empirical evidence 
suggests that house size is often a positional good, used to convey status (Wei, Zhang, & Liu, 2017). 
Similar results were reached by (Muhammad et al., 2011). 
The estimate of φ (income flexibility) is negative as expected and guarantees the negative 
semidefiniteness of the Slutsky matrix. The value is comparable to that found by (Muhammad et al., 
2011; Seale & Regmi, 2006).  
Table V below shows the results of the heteroskedasticity tests. 
  
 





































































The estimates for the heteroskedasticity model parameters are all statistical significant. The 
parameters h1 and h2 refer to the heteroskedasticity group II and group III respectively and the 
parameter h3 is associated with the scale heteroskedasticity (see section 2.3.4). The estimates of ẟi 
refer to homoskedastic standard deviation. The h1 and h2 estimates are positive and statistical 
significant as expected (Seale & Regmi, 2006). The h3 estimate is negative highlighting the fact that 
more affluent countries tend to have low variances. 
The Maximum likelihood procedure was not undertaken because the Shapiro Wilk tests (Table VI 















5.4. SECOND STAGE RESULTS 
 
The estimate of α7 is 0.1926 and contrasts with the actual US budget share for the seventh second 
stage group of luxury food items of 0.348. To a significant extent, the other shares are reasonable 
comparable. The higher level of heterogeneity found in the second stage dataset can explain this kind 
of divergence. 
As expected, the first (unprocessed grains and sugar) group has a negative β estimate. The fourth 
(dairy, eggs and fats), the fifth (fresh vegetables and fruits) and the seventh (luxury items) group have 
βs estimates that are not statistical significant, indicating expenditure elasticities around unity. The 
seventh group β is positive as expected but should also be statistically significant. This contradiction is 
perhaps associated with some developed world addiction to high calories foods that induces a buying 
behavior closer to that related to needs instead of wants. The second (processed grains), the third 
(meat and fish) and the sixth (processed vegetables and fruits) have positive βs estimates. Similar 
results were reached by (Muhammad et al., 2011). 
The symmetry of the Slutsky matrix is imposed. The estimates of its diagonal elements πii are negative 
and the matrix is negative semidefinite as expected. Therefore, the compensated law of demand is 
obeyed (Mas-Colell et al., 2006). 
Approx Approx
Pr > |t| Pr > |t|
α1 0.0817 0.0058 14.01 <.0001 ẟ6 0.0076 0.0003 29.94 <.0001
α2 0.1110 0.0044 25.38 <.0001 π11 -0.1375 0.0130 -10.57 <.0001
α3 0.2675 0.0088 30.39 <.0001 π12 -0.0147 0.0094 -1.56 0.1207
α4 0.1576 0.0057 27.69 <.0001 π13 -0.0268 0.0106 -2.53 0.0124
α5 0.1410 0.0053 26.43 <.0001 π14 0.0431 0.0112 3.85 0.0002
α6 0.0487 0.0038 12.71 <.0001 π15 0.0356 0.0105 3.38 0.0009
α7 0.1926 0.0092 20.87 <.0001 π16 -0.0167 0.0080 -2.11 0.0368
β1 -0.0898 0.0102 -8.83 <.0001 π22 -0.0724 0.0152 -4.75 <.0001
β2 0.0230 0.0075 3.06 0.0027 π23 0.0917 0.0090 10.24 <.0001
β3 0.0355 0.0168 2.12 0.0361 π24 0.0134 0.0120 1.12 0.2663
β4 0.0060 0.0086 0.70 0.4874 π25 0.0021 0.0114 0.19 0.8528
β5 -0.0164 0.0100 -1.64 0.1036 π26 0.0013 0.0101 0.13 0.9005
β6 0.0172 0.0057 3.00 0.0032 π33 -0.2013 0.0213 -9.46 <.0001
β7 0.0245 0.0159 1.54 0.1264 π34 0.0653 0.0105 6.22 <.0001
h1 36.2486 1.1167 32.46 <.0001 π35 0.0257 0.0107 2.40 0.0176
h2 33.6687 2.4539 13.72 <.0001 π36 -0.0044 0.0072 -0.61 0.5414
h3 -3.7705 0.0416 -90.69 <.0001 π44 -0.1834 0.0192 -9.56 <.0001
ẟ1 0.0097 0.0002 43.11 <.0001 π45 -0.0273 0.0134 -2.04 0.0431
ẟ2 0.0063 0.0001 50.95 <.0001 π46 0.0286 0.0113 2.53 0.0126
ẟ3 0.0072 0.0001 100.07 <.0001 π55 -0.1384 0.0168 -8.25 <.0001
ẟ4 0.0073 0.0001 51.77 <.0001 π56 0.0238 0.0092 2.58 0.0108














As for first stage, the heteroskedasticity model parameters are all statistical significant. In the second 
stage the Group II variance is higher than Group III.  
The Maximum likelihood procedure was not undertaken because the Shapiro Wilk tests (Table VIII 
below) to the final ITSUR residuals had rejected the null for all system equations. 
 
5.5. FIRST STAGE DISCUSSION 
 
The geometric mean prices budget shares estimates are all plausible. The group III (housing, water, 
electricity, gas and other fuels) appears as a luxury category. Clearly, up to a minimum required level, 
shelter, water and energy are essential and non-substitutable. However, once basic needs are satisfied, 
it is reasonable to view additional consumption as a luxury, as discussed in section 5.3. In fact, 
(Steinberger, 2016) shows that the high correlation between lower energy and lower Human 
Development Index (HDI) abates as energy use increases and at higher energy use, there is evidence 
of saturation and no statistically significant dependency is found. After achieving energy use levels of 
about 1/4 -1/3 of those in the US, there seems to be negligible real benefits. 
Perhaps the most important implication of these results concerns efforts to achieve ecological 
sustainability. Agriculture, which accounts for the vast majority of food production, is one of the 
greatest threats to global ecosystems (Foley et al., 2011; Godfray et al., 2010). Achieving ecological 
sustainability will require a reduction in these negative impacts. In an unequal capitalist economy, 
Pigouvian taxes that internalize the ecological costs of food production will directly increase food 
prices, while regulations that reduce the use of agrochemicals or agricultural lands will reduce food 
production, in response to which prices will rise. In either case, the real need of imposing limits to a 
growing economy and its implications on increasing food prices will have greater impact on the poor 
than the rich because the food shares of the former are higher, and rising food prices will severely 




























Health T & C Education Luxuries
Low 53 0.466 0.053 0.127 0.050 0.035 0.107 0.026 0.135
Middle 49 0.260 0.051 0.183 0.055 0.042 0.168 0.024 0.217
High 48 0.144 0.051 0.229 0.055 0.042 0.159 0.022 0.297





Graph I plots the geometric mean price indexes marginal shares estimates against real expenditures 
per capita. The graphic shows that the proportion of each additional dollar of income spent on wants 
(luxury goods and services) will increase with affluence, while the share spent on needs ( essential 
goods and services) will decrease. The graphic shows that luxuries shares increase with affluence and 
essential goods and services decrease. The only anomaly is the richest countries negative marginal 
shares for food. The Florida demand models were developed following the Chicago School assumption 
that tastes are constant across countries. The models use only one Slutsky matrix for every country 
across a seventy-fold range of real expenditures. Perhaps, in future improvements to the model, the 
dataset should be split into affluent and less affluent countries to acknowledge tastes differences 
across countries. As affluence increases the food buying decision becomes less important and the 
consumer can be unwilling to make the effort that is required to achieve a rational decision. (Keen, 
2011) notes that there are over 1030 possible options for filling our shopping carts in a typical 
supermarket. If we could compare the utility of a trillion carts per second, it would take a billion years 
to choose the optimal one. Perfect optimization is obviously impossible, and people simply strive to 
‘satisfice’, or find an acceptable rather than optimal market basket (Simon, 1956). As income increases, 
the opportunity costs of comparing options also rises, and it becomes rational to spend less time 
comparing marginal utilities. Behavior will increasingly deviate from conventional assumptions. In 
addition, richer societies are facing overfeeding issues and appear to be in a process of adjustment to 
a healthier nutrition. Finally, since the geometric mean food price index is lower than the rich 


























































































































Graph I - Marginal Shares
Food Clothing and footwear
Education Furnishings, household equipment and maintenance
Transport and communication health




In a perfect allocation system food marginal shares would be equal for every country. The 
discrepancies are an indicator of the market distortion. A redistribution towards poorer countries 
would increase total utility. Even if a pareto optimum is in place in every economy (normally it is not), 
the solution captured by the model seems to be far from a global optimum. 
 
Graph II plots expenditure elasticities against real expenditures per capita. Expenditure elasticities for 
wants should be greater than one, and for needs, less than one, as seen in this figure. The expenditure 
elasticities are higher in poorer countries. This reflects diminishing marginal utility of expenditure and 
the non-homothetic preferences, both embedded in the linear-logarithm specification of the 
Working’s model. Expenditure elasticities are particularly high for health and luxuries in the poorest 
countries, precisely because actual expenditures are so low. Even a tiny nominal increase in 
expenditures is a large percentage increase. 
When the preferences are homothetic the βi is zero, the shares are equal for every country and the 
expenditure elasticities are unitary and independent from affluence. That’s the reason behind the flat 
curves that describes the second (processed grains), the fourth (furnishings, household equipment and 
maintenance) and the seventh group (education). 
Estimated geometric mean price index budget shares for group V (health) were negative in some of 
the poorest countries (DR Congo, Niger and Burundi). One possible reason is the actual health care 
price index in those countries being lower than the geometric mean of reference. Nevertheless, there 
are significant discrepancies in health care systems across countries, which range from public sector 















































































































































































































































































































Graph II - Expenditure Elasticities




mainly private provision. Furthermore, the health care sector is strongly characterized by natural 
monopolies, legal barriers to entry, and government enforced monopolies on intellectual property 
(Farley & Farley, 2013). With such public intervention and market concentration, price indexes are far 
from perfect for ascertaining real costs of health systems across countries. This heterogeneity and the 
imposing restriction on tastes can explain the negative shares that were found. 
Some richer countries have negative expenditure elasticities for the group I (food). This issue is due to 
negative marginal shares that were discussed above. 
In a utility maximizing allocation system, food expenditure elasticities would be equal for every 
country. A redistribution towards poorer countries would increase total utility. Discrepancies in food 
expenditure elasticities is clear evidence of a non-utility maximizing allocation, defined here as a 
market distortion. 
 
Graph III plots the price elasticities of demand for food against real expenditure per capita. The Slutsky 
elasticities are compensated elasticities derived from the Hicksian demand function where real income 
and total utility remains constant. The Frisch elasticities are compensated elasticities where marginal 
utility of income remains constant. The Cournot elasticities are uncompensated elasticities derived 
from the Walrasian demand function where nominal income is constant and real income and total 
utility vary freely. Following the descending order of income restrictions, the Slutsky elasticity is the 




































































































































































































































































































































Graph III - Elasticity of Demand for Food




Positive demand elasticities for food for some rich countries are in line with the negative expenditure 
elasticities found and discussed above. 
In real life, there are few mechanisms available to ensure that real income, total utility or marginal 
utility remain constant as the prices of food or other commodities increase. To ascertain the 
consequences of imposing ecological thresholds on the economic system, whose main impact would 
be increasing food prices, Cournot elasticities are the most relevant. 
It is of upmost importance to know what are the implications on the real income of the poor if 
ecological thresholds are put in place through a market based mechanism. The Cournot elasticity 
estimates make evident that the poorer countries have more elastic demand curves, resulting primarily 
from the impact of increasing prices on real income, since there are no substitutes for food. This means 
that in an unequal market economy, if market based instruments are used to reduce the ecological 
degradation caused by food production, the poor will reduce consumption by a much greater 
percentage than the rich in response to price increases. Since the rich are responsible for far more 
ecological degradation than the poor, this outcome is highly perverse. This distortion is associated with 
the food shares and the marginal food shares that are higher in less affluent countries. 
5.6. SECOND STAGE DISCUSSION 
 
The geometric mean prices budget shares estimates are all plausible. Within the first stage food 
category, the second stage subcategory most directed implicated in the process of imposing ecological 
limits to the economic system is rice, cereals and sugar where the poorer have a higher budget share. 
Again, the impact on the real income of increasing grain prices would be stronger in poorer countries 












fresh fruits and 
veggies
froz fruits veg luxury
Low 53 0.244 0.062 0.228 0.136 0.171 0.030 0.129
Middle 49 0.102 0.107 0.258 0.165 0.159 0.033 0.176
High 48 0.057 0.117 0.272 0.166 0.153 0.039 0.196





Graph IV plots the geometric mean price indexes marginal shares estimates against real expenditures 
per capita. The graphic shows that luxuries shares increase with affluence and essential goods and 
services decrease. The only anomaly is the richest countries’ negative marginal shares for second stage 
group I (unprocessed grains and sugar). The models use only one Slutsky matrix for every country in a 
seventy-fold range of real expenditures. The geometric mean price index is lower than the rich 
countries actual food price indexes, it is therefore reasonable to expect that actual marginal shares are 
higher. Another alternative is that the negative marginal shares relate to the obesity epidemic and the 
shift away from starches and sugars that is just getting underway. For example, a recent study found 
significant declines in the consumption of sweetened beverages in the US in recent years (Bleich, 
Vercammen, Koma, & Li, 2017). 
In a perfect allocation system all second stage groups would have equal marginal shares for every 
country. For more essential groups, such as group I (unprocessed grains and sugar) and group V (fresh 
vegetables and fruits) that despite no statistically significant has a negative estimated β, the marginal 
shares decreases with affluence. Here, a redistribution towards poorer countries would increase total 
utility. For less essential groups, the marginal shares increase with affluence. Yet a redistribution 
toward the richer will not increase total utility. In fact, needs take precedence to wants. Needs 
marginal utility equilibrium across countries and consumers should be achieved first and only then 
some room can be given to wants production and consumption. Theoretically, it can be postulated 
through the two following assumptions. First, the marginal utility of needs is highest for low levels of 
income and is ever decreasing. Secondly, the marginal utility of wants is zero whenever the marginal 
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Graph IV - Marginal shares




ever decreasing. Thus, in every circumstance supplying wants when needs have positive marginal 
utilities is an overwhelming indication of market distortion. 
 
Graph V plots conditional expenditure elasticities against real expenditures per capita. They are all 
plausible. The conditional elasticities show that group VI (processed vegetables and fruits) and group 
II (processed grains) have the highest expenditure elasticity for the poorest nations and are luxury 
goods. Demand for processed fruits and vegetables, processed grains and group VII (miscellaneous 
luxury foods) are all elastic with respect to income. This is especially true for lower income countries, 
where current expenditures are low, and even a small nominal increase is a large percentage increase. 
Demand for staple grains (plus sugar) and fresh fruits and vegetables are inelastic with respect to 
income, showing their role as necessities. Some richer countries have negative expenditure elasticities 













































































































































































































































































































Graph V - Expenditure Elasticities





Perhaps the most important implication of these results concerns efforts to achieve ecological 
sustainability. Agriculture, which accounts for the vast majority of food production, is one of the 
greatest threats to global ecosystems (Foley et al., 2011; Godfray et al., 2010). Achieving ecological 
sustainability will require a reduction in these negative impacts. In an unequal capitalist economy, 
Pigouvian taxes that internalize the ecological costs of food production will directly increase food 
prices, while regulations that reduce the use of agrochemicals or agricultural lands will reduce food 
production, in response to which prices will rise. In either case, the real need of imposing limits to a 
growing economy and its implications on increasing food prices will have greater impact on the poor 
than the rich because the food shares of the former are higher, and rising food prices will severely 
reduce their real income. 
In a perfect allocation system food marginal shares would be equal for every country. The 
discrepancies shown are an indicator of the market distortion. A redistribution towards poorer 
countries would increase total utility. Even if a pareto optimum is in place in every economy (normally 
it is not), the solution captured by the model seems to be far from a global optimum. 
In a utility maximizing allocation system, food expenditure elasticities would be equal for every 
country. A redistribution towards poorer countries would increase total utility. Discrepancies in food 
expenditure elasticities is clear evidence of a non-utility maximizing allocation, defined here as a 
market distortion. 
It is of upmost importance to know what are the implications on the real income of the poor if 
ecological thresholds are put in place through a market based mechanism. The Cournot elasticity 
estimates make evident that the poorer countries have more elastic demand curves, resulting primarily 
from the impact of increasing prices on real income, since there are no substitutes for food. This means 
that in an unequal market economy, if market based instruments are used to reduce the ecological 
degradation caused by food production, the poor will reduce consumption by a much greater 
percentage than the rich in response to price increases. Since the rich are responsible for far more 
ecological degradation than the poor, this outcome is highly perverse. This distortion is associated with 
the food shares and the marginal food shares that are higher in less affluent countries. 
In a perfect allocation system all second stage groups would have equal marginal shares for every 
country. For more essential groups, such as group I (unprocessed grains and sugar) and group V (fresh 
vegetables and fruits), that despite no statistically significant has a negative estimated β, the marginal 
shares decreases with affluence. Here, a redistribution towards poorer countries would increase total 
utility. For less essential groups, the marginal shares increase with affluence. Yet a redistribution 
toward the richer will not increase total utility. In fact, needs take precedence to wants. Needs 
marginal utility equilibrium across countries and consumers should be achieved first and only then 
some room can be given to wants production and consumption. Theoretically, it can be postulated 
through the two following assumptions. First, the marginal utility of needs is highest for low levels of 
income and is ever decreasing. Secondly, the marginal utility of wants is zero whenever the marginal 




ever decreasing. Thus, in every circumstance supplying wants when needs have positive marginal 




7. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORKS 
The expenditure and consumption data retrieved from the World Bank International Comparison 
Program (ICP) does not come without problems. Poor data can be found in some African countries. As 
consumption of home-produced food in some low-income countries is normally understated, 
significant inaccuracies in the food expenditure estimates can prevail. The health care expenditures 
suffer from differences in the provision systems. More public state intervention usually leads to 
underestimated national expenditures. 
The ICP methodology does not preview the fundamental partition between needs and wants. The ICP 
broad categories are a mix of needs and wants. Even the food category is not free from wants as it is 
the case for more affluent countries. The ecological economics framework does not fit perfectly with 
World Bank methodological decisions. 
The Florida models assumption of constant tastes across countries is too restrictive. In further works 
a split between affluent and nonaffluent countries should be carried out. Nevertheless, the lack of 
degrees of freedom especially in the second stage estimation can then be an issue. 
Based on the ICP basic headings expenditures, a more adequate aggregation can be done that tries to 
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9.1. ANNEX I – FIRST STAGE DATASET 
 
D0 D1 D2 PLI1 PLI2 PLI3 PLI4 PLI5 PLI6 PLI7 PLI8 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
1 Algeria 5 0 0 1 0.5979 0.589 0.412 0.607 0.222 0.240 0.114 0.366 0.430 0.042 0.067 0.035 0.049 0.254 0.001 0.122 -2.0191
2 Angola 4 0 0 1 0.9320 0.918 0.645 1.191 0.436 0.601 0.203 0.750 0.491 0.060 0.105 0.067 0.033 0.076 0.014 0.154 -2.2926
3 Benin 3 0 1 0 0.7257 0.441 0.277 0.531 0.188 0.410 0.129 0.419 0.504 0.044 0.106 0.028 0.026 0.108 0.011 0.172 -3.2618
4 Botswana 2 0 1 0 1.0208 0.522 0.694 0.920 0.241 0.698 0.193 0.836 0.205 0.071 0.122 0.068 0.032 0.213 0.040 0.249 -1.8615
5 Burkina Faso 4 0 0 1 0.7203 0.382 0.274 0.528 0.287 0.534 0.052 0.439 0.532 0.022 0.114 0.045 0.029 0.101 0.007 0.150 -3.7382
6 Burundi 4 0 0 1 0.4666 0.290 0.122 0.330 0.109 0.360 0.039 0.751 0.480 0.011 0.170 0.010 0.008 0.085 0.004 0.233 -3.9624
7 Cameroon 3 0 1 0 0.5676 0.606 0.245 0.706 0.379 0.335 0.084 0.560 0.479 0.086 0.081 0.096 0.012 0.100 0.011 0.135 -2.7740




4 0 0 1 0.8451 0.455 0.250 0.665 0.365 0.596 0.056 0.494 0.589 0.074 0.046 0.053 0.010 0.046 0.017 0.165 -3.7416
10 Chad 4 0 0 1 0.7083 0.418 0.313 0.749 0.144 0.459 0.049 0.421 0.507 0.024 0.098 0.071 0.054 0.138 0.006 0.103 -3.1192
11 Comoros 4 0 0 1 0.6113 0.605 0.272 1.092 0.276 0.856 0.114 0.649 0.518 0.031 0.313 0.039 0.006 0.026 0.022 0.045 -3.7124
12 Congo, Rep. 3 0 1 0 1.0710 0.599 0.323 0.779 0.182 0.532 0.118 0.514 0.400 0.029 0.143 0.038 0.044 0.146 0.021 0.180 -3.0756
13 Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 0 0 1 0.9846 0.514 0.210 0.761 0.135 0.388 0.059 0.620 0.570 0.049 0.123 0.036 0.035 0.039 0.019 0.129 -4.2157
14 Côte d'Ivoire 3 0 1 0 0.6167 0.505 0.269 0.570 0.253 0.335 0.127 0.413 0.455 0.037 0.104 0.088 0.032 0.147 0.004 0.132 -2.8655
15 Djibouti 4 0 0 1 0.6385 0.574 0.361 0.651 0.261 0.543 0.162 0.364 0.330 0.032 0.340 0.061 0.011 0.071 0.023 0.131 -2.8961
16 Egypt, Arab Rep.a 3 0 1 0 0.4971 0.312 0.103 0.506 0.118 0.198 0.138 0.244 0.413 0.060 0.128 0.048 0.079 0.083 0.029 0.161 -1.2293
17 Equatorial Guinea 4 0 0 1 0.9439 0.162 0.518 1.022 0.187 0.595 0.065 0.380 0.416 0.033 0.155 0.042 0.063 0.129 0.032 0.131 -1.6139
18 Ethiopia 4 0 0 1 0.5673 0.176 0.241 0.353 0.138 0.224 0.027 0.228 0.382 0.053 0.168 0.099 0.079 0.021 0.012 0.187 -3.4668
19 Gabon 3 0 1 0 1.0287 0.756 0.597 0.688 0.383 0.527 0.305 0.560 0.348 0.059 0.160 0.053 0.040 0.148 0.020 0.173 -1.8224
20 Gambia, The 4 0 0 1 0.4776 0.206 0.225 0.430 0.132 0.280 0.114 0.268 0.446 0.076 0.072 0.027 0.149 0.055 0.057 0.117 -3.1148
21 Ghana 4 0 0 1 0.8782 0.452 0.363 0.663 0.153 0.260 0.115 0.300 0.405 0.155 0.109 0.076 0.022 0.088 0.080 0.065 -2.6030
22 Guinea 3 0 1 0 0.6630 0.275 0.081 0.351 0.142 0.256 0.055 0.326 0.593 0.071 0.081 0.040 0.067 0.058 0.029 0.062 -3.5489
23 Guinea-Bissau 4 0 0 1 0.5085 0.524 0.359 0.630 0.163 0.285 0.071 0.623 0.522 0.082 0.137 0.072 0.015 0.078 0.010 0.083 -3.5493
24 Kenya 3 0 1 0 0.6299 0.298 0.173 0.398 0.135 0.324 0.173 0.453 0.373 0.027 0.082 0.049 0.057 0.144 0.040 0.228 -2.8930
25 Lesotho 4 0 0 1 0.9219 0.485 0.238 0.770 0.243 0.408 0.189 0.637 0.326 0.159 0.129 0.111 0.012 0.078 0.016 0.169 -2.8706
26 Liberia 4 0 0 1 0.6388 0.390 0.460 0.478 0.149 0.561 0.077 0.493 0.270 0.128 0.226 0.054 0.016 0.062 0.116 0.127 -3.4950
27 Madagascar 2 0 1 0 0.4215 0.223 0.303 0.405 0.110 0.468 0.044 0.289 0.447 0.066 0.063 0.137 0.007 0.141 0.015 0.123 -3.3026
28 Malawi 1 1 0 0 0.8910 0.405 0.161 0.536 0.082 0.546 0.136 0.605 0.502 0.027 0.112 0.104 0.025 0.097 0.013 0.120 -3.4899
29 Mali 3 0 1 0 0.5769 0.433 0.327 0.587 0.148 0.526 0.113 0.378 0.482 0.060 0.100 0.062 0.028 0.161 0.010 0.097 -3.5761
30 Mauritania 4 0 0 1 0.5853 0.297 0.231 0.474 0.111 0.402 0.112 0.270 0.680 0.038 0.100 0.032 0.009 0.093 0.008 0.041 -3.0945
31 Mauritius 3 0 1 0 0.7877 0.497 0.452 0.842 0.256 0.850 0.292 0.723 0.275 0.055 0.143 0.076 0.026 0.157 0.041 0.226 -1.0958
32 Morocco 2 0 1 0 0.7727 0.504 0.193 0.646 0.381 0.548 0.278 0.526 0.351 0.042 0.142 0.047 0.040 0.154 0.023 0.200 -2.0574
33 Mozambique 4 0 0 1 0.8161 0.475 0.250 0.705 0.275 0.244 0.229 0.470 0.563 0.053 0.079 0.031 0.013 0.105 0.018 0.138 -3.7247
34 Namibia 4 0 0 1 1.1434 0.492 0.699 0.617 0.346 0.850 0.119 0.648 0.222 0.053 0.212 0.079 0.076 0.054 0.050 0.253 -1.6939
35 Niger 4 0 0 1 0.8241 0.313 0.326 0.417 0.285 0.344 0.037 0.454 0.432 0.080 0.104 0.050 0.035 0.103 0.011 0.186 -3.8577
36 Nigeria 2 0 1 0 0.8220 0.401 0.414 0.452 0.207 0.367 0.179 0.293 0.405 0.155 0.109 0.076 0.022 0.088 0.080 0.065 -2.7845
37 Rwanda 4 0 0 1 0.5064 0.438 0.176 0.257 0.103 0.331 0.112 0.466 0.509 0.035 0.175 0.034 0.020 0.081 0.024 0.121 -3.1447
38
São Tomé and 
Principe
4 0 0 1 0.7429 0.503 0.365 0.713 0.240 0.546 0.133 0.568 0.572 0.041 0.098 0.035 0.018 0.116 0.028 0.092 -2.4372
39 Senegal 2 0 1 0 0.6529 0.408 0.324 0.570 0.215 0.478 0.115 0.448 0.502 0.036 0.197 0.058 0.020 0.101 0.015 0.072 -2.8670
40 Seychelles 5 0 0 1 0.7330 0.674 0.313 0.859 0.210 0.718 0.293 0.794 0.456 0.049 0.199 0.049 0.020 0.091 0.037 0.098 -1.0538
41 Sierra Leone 3 0 1 0 0.5533 0.246 0.157 0.464 0.132 0.472 0.134 0.286 0.406 0.082 0.077 0.029 0.159 0.061 0.061 0.126 -3.0372
42 South Africa 4 0 0 1 0.8826 0.727 0.431 1.064 0.397 0.737 0.354 0.774 0.202 0.049 0.154 0.070 0.083 0.176 0.029 0.237 -1.5314
43 Sudanb 4 0 0 1 0.7701 0.287 0.450 0.639 0.156 0.429 0.149 0.513 0.524 0.045 0.148 0.066 0.011 0.100 0.029 0.078 -2.7506
44 Swaziland 3 0 1 0 0.8097 0.568 0.344 0.727 0.135 0.486 0.241 0.657 0.455 0.056 0.134 0.106 0.033 0.091 0.052 0.073 -1.7451
45 Tanzania 2 0 1 0 0.5570 0.292 0.281 0.483 0.082 0.213 0.119 0.383 0.682 0.069 0.073 0.045 0.028 0.041 0.026 0.037 -3.6345
46 Togo 4 0 0 1 0.8017 0.400 0.250 0.565 0.237 0.448 0.067 0.332 0.434 0.050 0.078 0.045 0.054 0.079 0.038 0.223 -3.1820
47 Tunisia 2 0 1 0 0.6401 0.727 0.270 0.626 0.312 0.467 0.156 0.500 0.238 0.075 0.151 0.066 0.045 0.193 0.004 0.228 -1.6659
48 Uganda 4 0 0 1 0.4228 0.287 0.258 0.521 0.096 0.333 0.070 0.357 0.367 0.032 0.188 0.062 0.022 0.086 0.063 0.179 -3.0586
49 Zambia 1 1 0 0 0.6921 0.496 0.351 0.708 0.116 0.571 0.217 0.306 0.622 0.067 0.125 0.016 0.009 0.042 0.050 0.069 -3.0566
50 Zimbabwe 2 0 1 0 0.8118 0.551 0.384 0.770 0.223 0.395 0.173 0.454 0.615 0.060 0.070 0.032 0.009 0.085 0.013 0.116 -3.5282
51 Bangladesh 3 0 1 0 0.3645 0.361 0.219 0.387 0.139 0.170 0.074 0.245 0.519 0.061 0.173 0.033 0.030 0.048 0.046 0.090 -2.6025




4 0 0 1 0.7010 0.824 0.415 1.576 0.422 0.918 0.297 0.725 0.222 0.053 0.140 0.053 0.010 0.249 0.059 0.213 -0.9947
54 Cambodia 4 0 0 1 0.4186 0.267 0.284 0.368 0.135 0.419 0.061 0.301 0.485 0.020 0.156 0.019 0.054 0.082 0.037 0.146 -2.6087
55 Chinac 4 0 0 1 0.6780 0.674 0.425 0.878 0.322 0.460 0.327 0.557 0.235 0.086 0.173 0.061 0.066 0.115 0.041 0.223 -2.2515
56 Fiji 3 0 1 0 0.7211 0.496 0.802 0.886 0.312 0.467 0.164 0.646 0.318 0.026 0.263 0.094 0.029 0.088 0.018 0.163 -1.9445
57
Hong Kong SAR, 
China
2 0 1 0 0.8556 0.522 0.739 0.856 0.452 0.558 0.457 0.665 0.114 0.046 0.200 0.058 0.053 0.096 0.028 0.404 -0.0174
58 India 4 0 0 1 0.4026 0.253 0.201 0.505 0.098 0.253 0.074 0.392 0.298 0.074 0.133 0.039 0.037 0.170 0.013 0.235 -2.4109
59 Indonesia 2 0 1 0 0.5324 0.550 0.351 0.522 0.137 0.567 0.106 0.408 0.403 0.040 0.214 0.029 0.024 0.093 0.033 0.163 -1.9511
q








D0 D1 D2 PLI1 PLI2 PLI3 PLI4 PLI5 PLI6 PLI7 PLI8 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8
60 Lao PDR 4 0 0 1 0.4310 0.278 0.178 0.517 0.123 0.636 0.025 0.415 0.527 0.016 0.132 0.027 0.017 0.122 0.017 0.142 -2.6349
61 Macao SAR, China 4 0 0 1 0.7973 0.694 0.581 1.152 0.273 0.756 0.174 0.610 0.109 0.070 0.172 0.023 0.027 0.131 0.031 0.437 -0.3892
62 Malaysia 4 0 0 1 0.6566 0.612 0.321 0.806 0.191 0.667 0.188 0.541 0.193 0.021 0.164 0.050 0.026 0.218 0.036 0.293 -1.2464
63 Maldives 4 0 0 1 0.6187 0.486 1.077 0.766 0.183 0.432 0.278 0.332 0.227 0.024 0.457 0.047 0.038 0.068 0.009 0.129 -2.2494
64 Mongolia 3 0 1 0 0.5200 0.553 0.356 0.769 0.056 0.315 0.085 0.455 0.316 0.055 0.159 0.016 0.015 0.206 0.046 0.186 -1.7149
65 Myanmar 5 0 0 1 0.4034 0.288 0.189 0.444 0.062 0.371 0.023 0.314 0.572 0.034 0.145 0.015 0.044 0.053 0.020 0.118 -2.5861
66 Nepal 3 0 1 0 0.4353 0.298 0.230 0.429 0.104 0.428 0.049 0.344 0.585 0.027 0.135 0.019 0.034 0.048 0.030 0.121 -2.8556
67 Pakistan 1 1 0 0 0.5105 0.308 0.194 0.527 0.076 0.249 0.062 0.294 0.458 0.048 0.201 0.034 0.059 0.084 0.032 0.084 -2.1113
68 Philippines 1 1 0 0 0.4867 0.512 0.277 0.535 0.139 0.278 0.077 0.422 0.428 0.014 0.123 0.041 0.024 0.140 0.040 0.190 -1.8578
69 Singapore 3 0 1 0 1.0075 0.724 0.968 1.104 0.354 0.923 0.451 0.729 0.069 0.029 0.201 0.056 0.076 0.158 0.033 0.379 -0.2486
70 Sri Lanka 1 1 0 0 0.4426 0.315 0.239 0.597 0.061 0.286 0.086 0.239 0.466 0.033 0.147 0.027 0.033 0.106 0.027 0.162 -1.5437
71 Taiwan, China 4 0 0 1 0.7381 0.455 0.477 0.799 0.156 0.527 0.250 0.537 0.126 0.046 0.177 0.048 0.100 0.150 0.045 0.308 -0.1830
72 Thailand 1 1 0 0 0.5207 0.384 0.217 0.593 0.131 0.491 0.128 0.432 0.291 0.038 0.103 0.046 0.045 0.182 0.016 0.279 -1.4664
73 Vietnam 3 0 1 0 0.4321 0.287 0.349 0.453 0.059 0.632 0.055 0.309 0.278 0.044 0.245 0.062 0.055 0.116 0.055 0.145 -2.1948
74 Armenia 3 0 1 0 0.7321 0.854 0.069 0.657 0.180 0.510 0.074 0.463 0.581 0.037 0.085 0.015 0.044 0.112 0.015 0.111 -1.4086
75 Azerbaijan 3 0 1 0 0.5220 0.718 0.119 0.526 0.218 0.478 0.083 0.395 0.407 0.102 0.088 0.055 0.023 0.177 0.018 0.130 -1.5134
76 Belarus 3 0 1 0 0.4457 0.603 0.077 0.589 0.111 0.295 0.079 0.395 0.382 0.076 0.089 0.055 0.024 0.152 0.013 0.208 -1.2735
77 Kazakhstan 3 0 1 0 0.6936 0.754 0.438 0.710 0.261 0.488 0.106 0.482 0.230 0.067 0.245 0.045 0.043 0.165 0.029 0.176 -1.1757
78 Kyrgyzstan 3 0 1 0 0.6575 0.688 0.069 0.535 0.215 0.293 0.052 0.329 0.412 0.078 0.078 0.038 0.016 0.184 0.022 0.171 -2.2422
79 Moldova 3 0 1 0 0.6411 0.816 0.161 0.737 0.267 0.589 0.082 0.337 0.332 0.068 0.143 0.084 0.036 0.162 0.010 0.165 -1.9470
80 Tajikistan 3 0 1 0 0.5494 0.744 0.069 0.673 0.167 0.331 0.087 0.381 0.513 0.099 0.071 0.039 0.027 0.160 0.012 0.078 -2.5672
81 Ukraine 3 0 1 0 0.6064 0.784 0.113 0.602 0.305 0.565 0.123 0.399 0.385 0.062 0.125 0.043 0.048 0.146 0.015 0.174 -1.6053
82 Albania 3 0 1 0 0.7343 0.736 0.402 0.834 0.233 0.867 0.037 0.490 0.451 0.046 0.146 0.079 0.036 0.085 0.015 0.143 -1.6515
83 Australia 3 0 1 0 1.6057 1.528 1.884 1.336 1.430 1.454 1.104 1.502 0.103 0.034 0.228 0.046 0.059 0.129 0.042 0.360 -0.4085
84 Austria 1 1 0 0 1.3105 1.123 1.033 1.273 0.930 1.465 1.058 1.141 0.097 0.058 0.214 0.063 0.036 0.149 0.012 0.372 -0.3510




4 0 0 1 0.8593 1.190 0.311 0.692 0.482 0.904 0.138 0.543 0.316 0.043 0.144 0.057 0.038 0.123 0.016 0.262 -1.5270
87 Bulgaria 3 0 1 0 0.7282 0.925 0.279 0.681 0.300 0.768 0.124 0.576 0.196 0.029 0.167 0.072 0.042 0.218 0.011 0.265 -1.2674
88 Canada 2 0 1 0 1.5507 1.208 1.218 1.430 1.326 1.342 1.009 1.347 0.093 0.041 0.235 0.055 0.043 0.172 0.014 0.347 -0.4753
89 Chile 2 0 1 0 1.0268 1.002 0.664 0.961 0.528 0.766 0.235 0.872 0.161 0.056 0.144 0.071 0.063 0.166 0.044 0.295 -1.0373
90 Croatia 4 0 0 1 1.0550 1.181 0.546 0.965 0.516 1.044 0.351 0.850 0.183 0.042 0.171 0.051 0.041 0.124 0.020 0.369 -0.9443
91 Cyprus 4 0 0 1 1.2023 1.115 0.731 1.115 0.770 1.041 0.858 0.972 0.127 0.059 0.187 0.049 0.050 0.145 0.028 0.356 -0.4103
92 Czech Republic 3 0 1 0 0.9169 1.135 0.808 1.008 0.517 1.125 0.340 0.776 0.145 0.030 0.265 0.052 0.025 0.122 0.008 0.352 -0.9663
93 Denmark 1 1 0 0 1.5665 1.440 1.694 1.367 1.285 1.782 1.167 1.536 0.112 0.046 0.293 0.049 0.031 0.138 0.010 0.322 -0.6250
94 Estonia 3 0 1 0 0.9700 1.135 0.750 0.993 0.570 1.032 0.292 0.838 0.189 0.061 0.215 0.036 0.025 0.158 0.009 0.307 -1.1936
95 Finland 2 0 1 0 1.2550 1.353 1.449 1.281 1.064 1.469 0.886 1.401 0.118 0.047 0.271 0.051 0.048 0.129 0.016 0.320 -0.5424
96 France 1 1 0 0 1.2086 1.167 1.304 1.270 0.933 1.428 0.794 1.153 0.130 0.041 0.249 0.056 0.037 0.164 0.011 0.311 -0.5285
97 Germany 1 1 0 0 1.1427 1.151 1.209 1.178 0.767 1.327 0.698 1.090 0.111 0.047 0.244 0.061 0.051 0.161 0.014 0.310 -0.4469
98 Greece 2 0 1 0 1.1047 1.060 0.949 1.185 0.680 1.313 0.581 1.076 0.159 0.037 0.250 0.039 0.064 0.144 0.026 0.282 -0.5502
99 Hungary 1 1 0 0 0.9014 0.922 0.497 0.821 0.435 1.219 0.234 0.624 0.167 0.028 0.222 0.042 0.045 0.163 0.022 0.312 -1.0610
100 Iceland 3 0 1 0 1.1813 1.528 0.804 1.365 0.887 1.531 0.822 1.339 0.140 0.040 0.227 0.067 0.034 0.165 0.015 0.313 -0.5452
101 Ireland 1 1 0 0 1.3340 1.166 1.263 1.266 1.183 1.497 0.729 1.437 0.099 0.041 0.229 0.042 0.045 0.156 0.033 0.354 -0.6712
102 Israel 2 0 1 0 1.3167 1.187 1.052 1.176 0.844 1.423 0.644 1.173 0.157 0.029 0.238 0.060 0.028 0.192 0.025 0.270 -0.7286
103 Italy 1 1 0 0 1.2351 1.196 1.111 1.288 0.929 1.272 0.666 1.122 0.142 0.075 0.223 0.071 0.030 0.149 0.011 0.301 -0.5696
104 Japan 1 1 0 0 1.7892 1.347 1.403 1.605 0.955 1.482 0.806 1.363 0.136 0.031 0.251 0.050 0.014 0.141 0.019 0.357 -0.5669
105 Korea, Rep. 1 1 0 0 1.2367 1.192 0.470 0.872 0.287 0.772 0.513 0.821 0.127 0.050 0.160 0.033 0.064 0.158 0.070 0.338 -0.6737
106 Latvia 3 0 1 0 0.9693 1.187 0.591 0.932 0.484 1.043 0.248 0.852 0.193 0.048 0.237 0.039 0.035 0.174 0.017 0.257 -1.1431
107 Lithuania 3 0 1 0 0.8713 1.170 0.494 0.925 0.541 1.066 0.238 0.759 0.241 0.061 0.162 0.059 0.047 0.174 0.006 0.249 -1.0567
108 Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 1.2801 1.137 1.887 1.325 1.074 1.435 1.905 1.088 0.080 0.045 0.236 0.061 0.022 0.200 0.012 0.344 -0.0266
109 Macedonia, FYR 3 0 1 0 0.6444 0.825 0.339 0.726 0.167 0.740 0.096 0.468 0.343 0.050 0.200 0.041 0.024 0.159 0.013 0.169 -1.4753
110 Malta 4 0 0 1 1.0770 1.128 0.583 1.126 0.683 1.193 0.444 0.826 0.149 0.040 0.121 0.067 0.042 0.161 0.023 0.399 -0.6151
111 Mexico 3 0 1 0 0.7443 0.672 0.808 0.731 0.646 0.719 0.108 0.671 0.232 0.030 0.205 0.056 0.036 0.223 0.004 0.214 -1.2854
112 Montenegro 4 0 0 1 0.7741 1.114 0.425 0.812 0.412 0.860 0.110 0.633 0.305 0.030 0.127 0.092 0.021 0.161 0.011 0.252 -1.0988
113 Netherlands 1 1 0 0 1.0529 1.219 1.343 1.230 1.046 1.513 0.808 1.168 0.115 0.052 0.240 0.058 0.027 0.166 0.006 0.335 -0.6255
114 New Zealand 3 0 1 0 1.3861 1.086 1.307 1.221 0.975 1.326 0.589 1.225 0.140 0.044 0.228 0.048 0.023 0.147 0.029 0.341 -0.6305
115 Norway 2 0 1 0 1.9945 1.716 1.471 1.416 1.307 1.795 1.326 1.928 0.126 0.051 0.217 0.054 0.030 0.168 0.008 0.345 -0.4116
116 Poland 1 1 0 0 0.6869 1.106 0.537 0.774 0.369 0.836 0.268 0.701 0.185 0.043 0.243 0.044 0.045 0.128 0.015 0.297 -0.9781
117 Portugal 2 0 1 0 0.9475 1.191 0.898 1.094 0.738 1.290 0.465 0.926 0.164 0.054 0.158 0.054 0.058 0.158 0.017 0.337 -0.7544















3 0 1 0 0.8557 0.826 0.237 0.714 0.480 0.683 0.162 0.594 0.305 0.091 0.103 0.049 0.037 0.170 0.011 0.234 -1.1202
120 Serbia 4 0 0 1 0.7743 1.141 0.429 0.898 0.412 0.839 0.133 0.538 0.272 0.037 0.234 0.038 0.051 0.178 0.013 0.178 -1.4398
121 Slovakia 3 0 1 0 0.9555 1.047 0.641 0.968 0.540 0.978 0.275 0.832 0.177 0.041 0.261 0.059 0.033 0.115 0.020 0.293 -0.9519
122 Slovenia 3 0 1 0 1.0690 1.128 0.819 1.100 0.679 1.228 0.625 0.935 0.147 0.054 0.196 0.061 0.035 0.183 0.013 0.311 -0.7943
123 Spain 1 1 0 0 1.0313 1.022 1.111 1.189 0.786 1.426 0.642 1.062 0.137 0.052 0.209 0.047 0.035 0.140 0.015 0.364 -0.6517
124 Sweden 3 0 1 0 1.3150 1.444 1.315 1.378 1.051 1.388 1.286 1.455 0.118 0.047 0.274 0.049 0.032 0.161 0.009 0.311 -0.5371
125 Switzerland 3 0 1 0 1.6877 1.540 2.375 1.492 1.300 1.509 1.664 1.619 0.088 0.033 0.248 0.041 0.151 0.113 0.008 0.319 -0.1801
126 Turkey 3 0 1 0 0.8897 0.737 0.408 0.780 0.424 0.721 0.108 0.729 0.231 0.054 0.187 0.079 0.032 0.194 0.012 0.211 -0.9956
127 United Kingdom 1 1 0 0 1.0602 0.908 1.510 1.244 0.788 1.357 0.887 1.190 0.088 0.056 0.244 0.048 0.019 0.151 0.037 0.358 -0.5085
128 United States 1 1 0 0 1.0000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.065 0.034 0.182 0.040 0.201 0.123 0.023 0.331 0.0000
129 Bolivia 2 0 1 0 0.5922 0.540 0.201 0.592 0.315 0.245 0.095 0.451 0.347 0.022 0.109 0.073 0.084 0.187 0.041 0.137 -2.0574
130 Brazil 1 1 0 0 0.9485 1.961 0.836 1.191 0.699 1.292 0.388 0.964 0.164 0.048 0.152 0.076 0.071 0.190 0.025 0.276 -1.4495
131 Colombia 4 0 0 1 0.7669 0.964 0.316 1.082 0.371 0.716 0.122 0.689 0.184 0.065 0.159 0.042 0.032 0.167 0.048 0.303 -1.3656




5 0 0 1 0.7117 0.721 0.366 0.895 0.378 0.668 0.077 0.498 0.248 0.033 0.151 0.037 0.052 0.175 0.030 0.274 -1.1808
134 Ecuador 2 0 1 0 0.7060 0.822 0.325 0.899 0.391 0.398 0.143 0.597 0.221 0.044 0.148 0.077 0.057 0.180 0.046 0.226 -1.5785
135 El Salvador 5 0 0 1 0.7706 0.871 0.274 0.735 0.486 0.260 0.063 0.544 0.268 0.055 0.176 0.099 0.055 0.127 0.023 0.197 -1.3725
136 Guatemala 5 0 0 1 0.7300 0.693 0.254 0.510 0.283 0.538 0.078 0.508 0.401 0.054 0.129 0.057 0.049 0.149 0.012 0.149 -1.7369
137 Haiti 5 0 0 1 0.7657 0.753 0.266 0.414 0.277 0.480 0.085 0.332 0.590 0.069 0.114 0.034 0.033 0.056 0.039 0.065 -2.9175
138 Honduras 5 0 0 1 0.7581 1.001 0.333 0.678 0.503 0.582 0.063 0.486 0.328 0.049 0.136 0.045 0.064 0.140 0.033 0.205 -2.1484
139 Nicaragua 5 0 0 1 0.6263 0.543 0.127 0.494 0.494 0.391 0.044 0.489 0.277 0.031 0.142 0.058 0.084 0.166 0.034 0.208 -2.0216
140 Panama 5 0 0 1 0.7411 0.813 0.295 0.816 0.417 0.483 0.114 0.639 0.186 0.067 0.215 0.080 0.029 0.181 0.022 0.219 -1.1562
141 Paraguay 2 0 1 0 0.7381 1.129 0.356 0.659 0.523 0.549 0.127 0.619 0.300 0.056 0.098 0.088 0.056 0.133 0.047 0.222 -1.8836
142 Peru 2 0 1 0 0.6954 0.742 0.342 0.938 0.342 0.388 0.142 0.601 0.238 0.066 0.111 0.052 0.049 0.153 0.056 0.275 -1.4661
143 Uruguay 1 1 0 0 1.0637 1.452 0.513 1.141 0.652 0.770 0.221 0.868 0.210 0.051 0.217 0.063 0.073 0.129 0.024 0.234 -1.0152
144 Venezuela, RB 2 0 1 0 1.2996 2.062 0.207 1.793 0.587 0.380 0.097 1.099 0.238 0.051 0.054 0.063 0.070 0.209 0.026 0.289 -1.2293




3 0 1 0 1.2163 0.812 0.423 1.011 0.402 1.164 0.197 0.779 0.175 0.026 0.281 0.049 0.053 0.177 0.018 0.221 -1.0642
147 Aruba 5 0 0 1 1.1355 0.919 0.541 1.453 0.547 1.092 0.605 1.051 0.094 0.040 0.418 0.052 0.016 0.196 0.006 0.178 -0.5036
148 Bahamas, The 3 0 1 0 1.2744 1.268 0.773 1.996 0.828 1.343 0.439 1.167 0.103 0.035 0.332 0.047 0.051 0.127 0.038 0.267 -0.7812
149 Barbados 3 0 1 0 1.2195 0.758 0.757 1.417 0.524 1.128 0.253 1.193 0.121 0.016 0.450 0.024 0.011 0.097 0.005 0.277 -0.6941
150 Belize 3 0 1 0 0.9479 0.730 0.165 0.820 0.330 0.803 0.106 0.809 0.192 0.083 0.266 0.070 0.042 0.170 0.033 0.146 -1.2771
151 Bermuda 3 0 1 0 1.7316 1.494 2.120 1.460 1.202 1.293 0.389 1.711 0.101 0.023 0.323 0.055 0.029 0.103 0.027 0.339 0.0628
152 Cayman Islands 5 0 0 1 1.5699 1.199 0.971 2.309 1.308 1.323 0.322 1.300 0.065 0.031 0.366 0.050 0.023 0.145 0.025 0.294 0.0445
153 Curaçao 5 0 0 1 0.9747 1.079 0.412 1.107 0.401 1.099 0.224 0.945 0.108 0.078 0.310 0.031 0.041 0.136 0.009 0.288 -0.4021
154 Dominica 3 0 1 0 1.0354 0.558 0.398 1.286 0.380 0.908 0.099 0.836 0.188 0.053 0.247 0.054 0.035 0.250 0.014 0.158 -1.3182
155 Grenada 3 0 1 0 1.0953 0.985 0.397 1.152 0.538 0.899 0.043 0.751 0.215 0.048 0.212 0.045 0.022 0.304 0.009 0.146 -1.1801
156 Jamaica 3 0 1 0 1.1775 0.673 0.372 0.919 0.650 0.848 0.115 0.803 0.265 0.017 0.128 0.053 0.033 0.160 0.020 0.324 -1.5129
157 Montserrat 5 0 0 1 1.2648 0.846 0.404 1.393 0.527 1.001 0.099 0.797 0.175 0.014 0.209 0.046 0.021 0.369 0.002 0.165 -0.9747
158 St. Kitts and Nevis 3 0 1 0 1.3045 0.757 0.359 1.758 0.371 1.064 0.064 0.875 0.180 0.047 0.286 0.069 0.029 0.155 0.006 0.228 -0.8223
159 St. Lucia 3 0 1 0 1.0447 0.738 0.386 1.551 0.392 0.875 0.133 0.668 0.218 0.066 0.249 0.061 0.035 0.161 0.030 0.181 -1.3697
160
St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines
3 0 1 0 1.0915 0.746 0.426 1.150 0.361 0.779 0.086 0.771 0.195 0.020 0.258 0.042 0.029 0.238 0.003 0.216 -1.3475
161 Sint Maarten 5 0 0 1 1.1038 0.782 0.569 1.148 0.462 0.859 0.323 1.014 0.090 0.053 0.429 0.046 0.032 0.175 0.006 0.169 -0.4701




3 0 1 0 1.0199 0.787 0.504 1.087 0.624 0.753 0.138 0.694 0.267 0.017 0.126 0.053 0.032 0.161 0.020 0.324 -1.0715
164
Turks and Caicos 
Islands




5 0 0 1 1.4660 1.097 1.157 1.616 0.749 1.060 0.595 1.218 0.184 0.101 0.221 0.135 0.035 0.136 0.011 0.176 -1.2867
166 Bahrain 3 0 1 0 0.6622 0.602 0.435 0.851 0.553 0.459 0.331 0.539 0.156 0.066 0.236 0.082 0.030 0.175 0.057 0.197 -0.6574
167 Iraq 4 0 0 1 0.6526 0.702 0.270 0.646 0.249 0.587 0.080 0.473 0.362 0.070 0.307 0.056 0.025 0.102 0.009 0.069 -2.0131
168 Jordan 3 0 1 0 0.6651 0.444 0.233 0.522 0.206 0.464 0.129 0.356 0.313 0.049 0.225 0.048 0.026 0.157 0.073 0.109 -1.2585
169 Kuwait 4 0 0 1 0.7415 0.842 0.432 0.915 0.841 0.536 0.303 0.779 0.183 0.092 0.275 0.146 0.017 0.127 0.003 0.156 -0.5540




5 0 0 1 0.8601 0.613 0.704 0.687 0.254 0.638 0.092 0.722 0.360 0.066 0.124 0.059 0.062 0.141 0.047 0.141 -2.0621
172 Qatar 3 0 1 0 0.7242 0.754 0.821 0.995 0.633 0.599 0.404 1.074 0.142 0.047 0.300 0.055 0.014 0.143 0.061 0.238 -0.7779




5 0 0 1 0.8108 0.761 0.754 0.763 0.641 0.718 0.349 0.930 0.120 0.126 0.339 0.036 0.010 0.224 0.034 0.112 -0.1522
175 Yemen 3 0 1 0 0.7720 0.322 0.197 0.572 0.165 0.310 0.044 0.227 0.485 0.047 0.149 0.032 0.091 0.073 0.020 0.103 -2.4541
176 Georgia 3 0 1 0 0.7268 0.885 0.081 0.871 0.202 0.496 0.085 0.508 0.332 0.027 0.120 0.040 0.092 0.128 0.046 0.216 -1.3634
177 Iran, Islamic Rep. 3 0 1 0 0.6964 0.755 0.325 0.657 0.172 0.306 0.044 0.478 0.265 0.047 0.315 0.041 0.064 0.114 0.020 0.136 -1.3210








9.2. ANNEX II – SECOND STAGE DATASET 
 
D0 D1 D2 PLI1 PLI2 PLI3 PLI4 PLI5 PLI6 PLI7 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7
1 Algeria 5 0 0 1 0.9370 0.231 0.907 0.742 0.442 0.808 0.697 0.096 0.046 0.253 0.183 0.292 0.014 0.117 -0.5854
2 Angola 4 0 0 1 1.4798 0.495 0.739 1.690 1.198 1.221 1.498 0.210 0.122 0.314 0.097 0.134 0.057 0.065 -0.4551
3 Benin 3 0 1 0 1.2085 0.684 0.567 1.291 0.418 1.127 1.268 0.304 0.072 0.165 0.089 0.227 0.058 0.085 -1.6496
4 Botswana 2 0 1 0 1.0661 0.629 0.891 1.585 0.810 1.294 1.117 0.290 0.060 0.153 0.141 0.103 0.017 0.236 -1.1555
5 Burkina Faso 4 0 0 1 0.8398 0.977 0.532 1.628 0.438 1.182 1.294 0.301 0.070 0.222 0.119 0.162 0.019 0.107 -2.0352
6 Burundi 4 0 0 1 0.9780 0.449 0.549 1.068 0.281 1.057 1.360 0.235 0.004 0.088 0.034 0.436 0.003 0.200 -2.3675
7 Cameroon 3 0 1 0 1.0729 0.641 0.591 1.537 0.368 1.488 1.171 0.143 0.053 0.234 0.093 0.366 0.002 0.109 -0.9766




4 0 0 1 0.9256 0.903 0.662 1.443 0.578 2.051 1.734 0.183 0.058 0.295 0.128 0.169 0.022 0.145 -1.9937
10 Chad 4 0 0 1 1.0845 0.773 0.563 1.296 0.558 1.491 1.306 0.239 0.043 0.484 0.087 0.094 0.008 0.045 -1.5177
11 Comoros 4 0 0 1 0.4747 0.496 0.793 1.580 0.912 1.317 1.422 0.476 0.092 0.170 0.062 0.133 0.019 0.048 -2.0211
12 Congo, Rep. 3 0 1 0 0.7970 0.852 0.832 1.498 0.778 1.527 1.721 0.077 0.090 0.208 0.095 0.150 0.065 0.315 -1.9988
13 Congo, Dem. Rep. 4 0 0 1 1.2493 0.572 0.798 1.653 0.661 1.354 1.906 0.307 0.058 0.234 0.104 0.140 0.084 0.073 -2.8207
14 Côte d'Ivoire 3 0 1 0 0.5958 0.739 0.741 1.647 0.493 1.449 1.168 0.131 0.032 0.197 0.092 0.488 0.019 0.041 -1.2588
15 Djibouti 4 0 0 1 0.6439 0.836 0.509 1.190 0.507 1.054 0.877 0.146 0.128 0.227 0.136 0.258 0.013 0.091 -1.6502
16 Egypt, Arab Rep.a 3 0 1 0 0.7156 0.374 0.685 0.790 0.250 0.554 0.512 0.108 0.060 0.338 0.205 0.189 0.030 0.070 -0.1449
17 Equatorial Guinea 4 0 0 1 1.0038 0.603 0.681 1.441 1.248 1.239 1.509 0.107 0.091 0.295 0.107 0.172 0.041 0.187 -0.5646
18 Ethiopia 4 0 0 1 0.9483 0.292 0.364 0.875 0.234 0.686 0.691 0.613 0.046 0.061 0.028 0.140 0.023 0.089 -2.4826
19 Gabon 3 0 1 0 0.7539 1.267 0.743 1.449 1.217 1.683 1.473 0.073 0.090 0.295 0.088 0.278 0.020 0.155 -0.5928
20 Gambia, The 4 0 0 1 0.3789 0.551 0.309 0.993 0.601 1.150 0.782 0.326 0.021 0.180 0.148 0.182 0.056 0.087 -1.8248
21 Ghana 4 0 0 1 0.8936 0.840 0.700 1.311 0.769 1.054 1.370 0.139 0.063 0.272 0.076 0.221 0.030 0.198 -1.6062
22 Guinea 3 0 1 0 0.7349 0.644 0.428 1.310 0.482 1.066 0.982 0.561 0.032 0.161 0.073 0.086 0.049 0.036 -2.2300
23 Guinea-Bissau 4 0 0 1 0.4182 0.545 0.424 0.620 0.968 1.273 1.130 0.232 0.044 0.400 0.135 0.033 0.019 0.137 -1.6332
24 Kenya 3 0 1 0 0.8883 0.388 0.479 0.923 0.448 1.003 0.753 0.312 0.055 0.124 0.161 0.228 0.020 0.100 -1.7410
25 Lesotho 4 0 0 1 1.0868 0.508 0.849 1.153 0.614 1.147 1.166 0.445 0.021 0.167 0.117 0.157 0.005 0.088 -1.8489
26 Liberia 4 0 0 1 0.5092 0.745 0.529 1.032 0.864 1.652 1.029 0.276 0.030 0.315 0.089 0.185 0.040 0.064 -2.8286
27 Madagascar 2 0 1 0 0.3874 0.538 0.303 1.147 0.331 1.022 0.652 0.296 0.109 0.178 0.097 0.170 0.016 0.134 -1.6214
28 Malawi 1 1 0 0 0.9997 0.694 0.400 1.646 0.718 1.379 1.110 0.402 0.042 0.036 0.052 0.274 0.104 0.091 -2.1623
29 Mali 3 0 1 0 0.5754 0.632 0.378 1.361 0.618 1.157 1.047 0.441 0.031 0.206 0.087 0.130 0.019 0.085 -1.8227
30 Mauritania 4 0 0 1 0.6837 0.457 0.458 1.097 0.641 0.875 0.768 0.167 0.057 0.442 0.199 0.070 0.002 0.064 -1.0537
31 Mauritius 3 0 1 0 0.6090 0.502 0.795 0.981 0.838 1.059 0.999 0.105 0.102 0.262 0.180 0.171 0.058 0.122 0.1103
32 Morocco 2 0 1 0 1.3046 0.702 0.737 0.848 0.505 1.009 0.916 0.168 0.060 0.323 0.174 0.154 0.009 0.111 -0.9036
33 Mozambique 4 0 0 1 1.0891 0.484 0.524 1.480 0.669 1.511 1.335 0.338 0.077 0.187 0.087 0.152 0.077 0.081 -2.0628
34 Namibia 4 0 0 1 1.5036 0.721 0.864 1.427 0.986 1.636 1.236 0.222 0.039 0.187 0.057 0.107 0.029 0.358 -1.2017
35 Niger 4 0 0 1 0.8747 0.888 0.517 1.469 0.561 1.298 1.269 0.455 0.036 0.136 0.165 0.114 0.002 0.091 -2.6246
36 Nigeria 2 0 1 0 0.7046 0.827 0.661 1.406 0.817 1.345 1.077 0.139 0.063 0.272 0.076 0.221 0.030 0.198 -1.6048
37 Rwanda 4 0 0 1 1.0325 0.720 0.457 1.413 0.263 1.502 1.198 0.296 0.026 0.069 0.069 0.345 0.139 0.055 -1.5483
38
São Tomé and 
Principe
4 0 0 1 0.6550 0.683 0.593 1.442 0.806 1.258 1.262 0.196 0.116 0.332 0.134 0.110 0.033 0.080 -0.5696
39 Senegal 2 0 1 0 0.6680 0.695 0.396 1.488 0.670 1.054 1.053 0.256 0.071 0.243 0.163 0.128 0.019 0.119 -1.1655
40 Seychelles 5 0 0 1 0.4419 0.767 0.653 1.118 1.181 1.023 1.251 0.200 0.112 0.259 0.135 0.168 0.028 0.097 0.5829
41 Sierra Leone 3 0 1 0 0.4618 0.567 0.433 0.948 0.500 0.986 1.036 0.332 0.025 0.160 0.127 0.189 0.066 0.103 -1.9612
42 South Africa 4 0 0 1 0.9256 0.572 0.850 1.080 0.692 1.306 1.123 0.091 0.097 0.274 0.125 0.109 0.012 0.291 -0.7177
43 Sudanb 4 0 0 1 1.1415 0.471 0.683 1.278 0.729 1.049 0.716 0.166 0.102 0.232 0.147 0.239 0.012 0.102 -1.0538
44 Swaziland 3 0 1 0 1.0009 0.346 0.856 1.129 0.598 1.067 1.083 0.316 0.066 0.271 0.112 0.128 0.010 0.097 -0.2590
45 Tanzania 2 0 1 0 0.7684 0.524 0.362 1.183 0.359 0.650 0.797 0.414 0.024 0.172 0.077 0.167 0.081 0.065 -1.6780
46 Togo 4 0 0 1 1.1706 0.735 0.517 1.554 0.449 1.437 1.184 0.211 0.062 0.178 0.131 0.145 0.003 0.269 -2.0554
47 Tunisia 2 0 1 0 1.4155 0.493 0.796 0.855 0.354 0.983 0.784 0.097 0.095 0.204 0.227 0.197 0.027 0.155 -0.7004
48 Uganda 4 0 0 1 0.9028 0.393 0.416 0.814 0.295 0.928 0.856 0.215 0.045 0.144 0.089 0.434 0.001 0.073 -1.7821
49 Zambia 1 1 0 0 0.8688 0.456 0.586 1.323 0.553 1.206 0.681 0.219 0.115 0.398 0.174 0.021 0.024 0.050 -1.1346
50 Zimbabwe 2 0 1 0 0.8334 0.637 0.592 1.269 0.716 1.383 1.131 0.376 0.038 0.177 0.085 0.160 0.085 0.078 -1.5906
51 Bangladesh 3 0 1 0 0.3269 0.501 0.362 0.771 0.256 0.483 0.556 0.428 0.026 0.191 0.090 0.122 0.013 0.130 -0.8908
52 Bhutan 4 0 0 1 0.3724 0.319 0.428 0.746 0.356 0.612 0.601 0.220 0.055 0.113 0.275 0.189 0.065 0.082 -0.9640
53 Brunei Darussalam 4 0 0 1 0.3097 0.923 0.694 1.108 0.913 0.892 0.818 0.104 0.112 0.322 0.125 0.145 0.017 0.174 0.1583
54 Cambodia 4 0 0 1 0.2708 0.663 0.472 0.923 0.446 0.622 0.545 0.285 0.044 0.296 0.126 0.129 0.015 0.105 -0.9903
55 Chinac 4 0 0 1 0.5292 1.068 0.631 1.253 0.558 0.841 0.832 0.147 0.072 0.323 0.127 0.201 0.048 0.082 -1.2380
56 Fiji 3 0 1 0 0.5960 0.655 0.595 1.155 0.608 1.078 0.982 0.110 0.052 0.284 0.103 0.156 0.004 0.291 -0.4836
57
Hong Kong SAR, 
China
2 0 1 0 0.5797 0.838 0.824 1.291 0.879 0.884 0.910 0.026 0.065 0.539 0.058 0.103 0.014 0.194 0.2826
58 India 4 0 0 1 0.4011 0.303 0.342 0.598 0.292 0.521 0.575 0.236 0.016 0.096 0.271 0.263 0.030 0.090 -1.2612
59 Indonesia 2 0 1 0 0.4088 0.706 0.390 1.085 0.504 1.372 0.678 0.226 0.058 0.173 0.143 0.184 0.019 0.196 -0.4321








D0 D1 D2 PLI1 PLI2 PLI3 PLI4 PLI5 PLI6 PLI7 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7
60 Lao PDR 4 0 0 1 0.3578 0.765 0.485 0.963 0.424 0.537 0.686 0.404 0.023 0.349 0.029 0.141 0.000 0.053 -0.9370
61 Macao SAR, China 4 0 0 1 0.4734 0.865 0.744 1.327 0.842 0.912 0.888 0.057 0.108 0.424 0.091 0.185 0.025 0.110 -0.1895
62 Malaysia 4 0 0 1 0.5109 0.761 0.496 0.956 0.716 0.786 0.775 0.074 0.062 0.292 0.190 0.166 0.063 0.153 -0.4784
63 Maldives 4 0 0 1 0.5951 0.867 0.341 1.105 1.023 0.919 0.872 0.167 0.068 0.246 0.142 0.136 0.018 0.224 -1.0459
64 Mongolia 3 0 1 0 0.7726 0.584 0.273 0.963 1.012 0.919 0.776 0.066 0.053 0.303 0.336 0.073 0.014 0.155 -0.5951
65 Myanmar 5 0 0 1 0.2968 0.608 0.399 1.044 0.384 0.444 0.496 0.229 0.028 0.311 0.107 0.192 0.048 0.084 -0.9969
66 Nepal 3 0 1 0 0.3938 0.431 0.467 0.715 0.325 0.536 0.551 0.413 0.018 0.163 0.175 0.153 0.017 0.061 -1.0742
67 Pakistan 1 1 0 0 0.6386 0.329 0.431 0.686 0.250 0.856 0.561 0.282 0.012 0.090 0.346 0.129 0.002 0.138 -0.8864
68 Philippines 1 1 0 0 0.3761 0.573 0.454 0.932 0.641 0.743 0.567 0.261 0.047 0.353 0.111 0.094 0.003 0.131 -0.3752
69 Singapore 3 0 1 0 0.7830 1.027 1.033 1.346 0.952 1.021 0.952 0.059 0.105 0.323 0.106 0.101 0.049 0.256 -0.4987
70 Sri Lanka 1 1 0 0 0.3131 0.490 0.347 0.994 0.474 0.654 0.555 0.247 0.073 0.183 0.130 0.142 0.152 0.073 -0.0721
71 Taiwan, China 4 0 0 1 0.6661 0.855 0.691 1.075 0.637 0.805 0.836 0.079 0.135 0.289 0.080 0.231 0.016 0.169 -0.0829
72 Thailand 1 1 0 0 0.3545 0.705 0.450 0.999 0.490 0.748 0.726 0.163 0.033 0.217 0.130 0.261 0.018 0.178 -0.3078
73 Vietnam 3 0 1 0 0.2885 0.680 0.520 0.859 0.381 0.704 0.539 0.259 0.043 0.400 0.069 0.116 0.024 0.090 -1.3410
74 Armenia 3 0 1 0 1.1672 0.485 0.863 1.029 0.521 1.057 0.908 0.060 0.141 0.188 0.241 0.213 0.062 0.096 -0.0053
75 Azerbaijan 3 0 1 0 0.8428 0.462 0.640 0.727 0.338 0.771 0.717 0.091 0.067 0.276 0.162 0.287 0.021 0.096 -0.0570
76 Belarus 3 0 1 0 0.6150 0.346 0.657 0.461 0.265 0.793 0.652 0.057 0.085 0.288 0.222 0.203 0.017 0.129 0.0066
77 Kazakhstan 3 0 1 0 0.8289 0.504 0.806 0.872 0.483 0.913 0.747 0.076 0.117 0.269 0.217 0.152 0.025 0.143 -0.3271
78 Kyrgyzstan 3 0 1 0 0.9151 0.486 0.642 0.849 0.406 0.873 0.735 0.281 0.103 0.179 0.207 0.153 0.011 0.065 -1.2599
79 Moldova 3 0 1 0 0.8425 0.405 0.807 0.826 0.412 0.901 0.758 0.107 0.116 0.234 0.222 0.158 0.054 0.108 -0.8353
80 Tajikistan 3 0 1 0 0.9303 0.465 0.706 1.001 0.339 0.964 0.790 0.138 0.135 0.112 0.190 0.299 0.035 0.091 -1.0480
81 Ukraine 3 0 1 0 0.6495 0.400 0.687 0.816 0.479 0.873 0.613 0.075 0.111 0.291 0.232 0.180 0.019 0.092 -0.3808
82 Albania 3 0 1 0 0.9077 0.597 0.771 0.957 0.509 1.019 0.949 0.078 0.084 0.248 0.257 0.216 0.029 0.090 -0.1317
83 Australia 3 0 1 0 1.7195 1.607 1.419 1.656 1.747 1.469 1.669 0.036 0.119 0.207 0.130 0.160 0.041 0.306 0.0137
84 Austria 1 1 0 0 1.1272 1.397 1.770 1.103 1.265 1.386 1.173 0.024 0.159 0.225 0.159 0.129 0.034 0.270 -0.0653




4 0 0 1 0.9076 0.684 0.994 0.873 0.672 0.888 0.932 0.048 0.096 0.306 0.233 0.133 0.016 0.168 -0.3633
87 Bulgaria 3 0 1 0 0.8341 0.507 0.815 1.040 0.559 0.905 0.859 0.034 0.140 0.255 0.151 0.179 0.038 0.204 -0.5290
88 Canada 2 0 1 0 1.6700 1.633 1.637 1.750 1.332 1.349 1.519 0.036 0.110 0.198 0.169 0.101 0.103 0.281 -0.2830
89 Chile 2 0 1 0 1.0248 0.886 1.156 1.268 0.684 1.248 1.197 0.027 0.159 0.287 0.175 0.142 0.033 0.178 -0.4674
90 Croatia 4 0 0 1 1.1177 0.948 1.055 1.082 0.785 1.298 1.214 0.091 0.097 0.209 0.211 0.108 0.012 0.271 -0.1966
91 Cyprus 4 0 0 1 1.3043 1.285 1.175 1.474 0.849 1.346 1.248 0.040 0.142 0.229 0.216 0.140 0.040 0.192 0.0125
92 Czech Republic 3 0 1 0 0.8264 0.726 1.046 0.955 0.786 1.081 1.011 0.035 0.122 0.253 0.203 0.158 0.028 0.201 -0.2584
93 Denmark 1 1 0 0 1.2050 1.701 1.795 1.227 1.329 1.455 1.818 0.024 0.115 0.252 0.167 0.129 0.036 0.276 -0.0700
94 Estonia 3 0 1 0 1.0628 0.869 1.053 0.941 0.855 1.091 1.018 0.035 0.133 0.242 0.241 0.103 0.041 0.207 -0.2494
95 Finland 2 0 1 0 0.9234 1.472 1.531 1.102 1.181 1.238 1.203 0.045 0.123 0.243 0.199 0.133 0.048 0.209 0.1334
96 France 1 1 0 0 1.0621 1.106 1.631 1.043 1.188 1.069 1.029 0.014 0.137 0.322 0.168 0.120 0.039 0.200 0.1746
97 Germany 1 1 0 0 1.0136 1.090 1.687 0.977 1.023 1.225 1.038 0.046 0.148 0.238 0.162 0.124 0.038 0.244 0.0796
98 Greece 2 0 1 0 1.4678 1.136 1.202 1.367 0.696 1.338 1.209 0.081 0.148 0.243 0.226 0.170 0.012 0.119 0.2568
99 Hungary 1 1 0 0 0.9202 0.746 0.992 0.972 0.764 1.139 0.937 0.047 0.130 0.227 0.230 0.132 0.020 0.214 -0.4481
100 Iceland 3 0 1 0 1.1863 1.315 1.176 0.999 1.125 1.402 1.272 0.031 0.104 0.275 0.171 0.092 0.035 0.292 0.1910
101 Ireland 1 1 0 0 1.1342 1.195 1.587 1.189 1.423 1.297 1.297 0.023 0.143 0.250 0.162 0.141 0.058 0.222 -0.2630
102 Israel 2 0 1 0 1.1808 1.401 1.476 1.700 0.805 1.624 1.655 0.041 0.135 0.239 0.160 0.180 0.035 0.210 0.0314
103 Italy 1 1 0 0 1.1270 1.188 1.548 1.266 0.996 1.291 1.026 0.025 0.176 0.307 0.177 0.134 0.049 0.132 0.1437
104 Japan 1 1 0 0 3.4621 2.042 1.594 2.149 2.614 1.834 1.614 0.050 0.081 0.213 0.062 0.100 0.027 0.467 -0.0610
105 Korea, Rep. 1 1 0 0 1.2263 1.370 1.204 1.498 1.406 1.351 1.015 0.077 0.126 0.244 0.097 0.196 0.036 0.223 -0.6194
106 Latvia 3 0 1 0 1.0668 0.778 1.026 1.040 0.816 1.083 1.108 0.044 0.121 0.277 0.203 0.151 0.035 0.170 -0.2790
107 Lithuania 3 0 1 0 0.9815 0.742 0.869 0.972 0.722 1.022 0.965 0.054 0.111 0.285 0.211 0.141 0.037 0.162 0.1090
108 Luxembourg 1 1 0 0 1.0658 1.233 1.718 1.244 1.218 1.159 1.085 0.023 0.178 0.264 0.171 0.098 0.029 0.238 0.2095
109 Macedonia, FYR 3 0 1 0 0.8888 0.465 0.774 0.770 0.464 0.869 0.746 0.064 0.129 0.233 0.223 0.179 0.022 0.150 -0.1159
110 Malta 4 0 0 1 1.2609 0.945 1.104 1.190 0.922 1.062 1.150 0.039 0.137 0.256 0.163 0.126 0.063 0.216 -0.0181
111 Mexico 3 0 1 0 0.9789 0.667 0.806 0.811 0.554 0.994 0.782 0.066 0.204 0.266 0.155 0.105 0.002 0.201 -0.0638
112 Montenegro 4 0 0 1 1.0010 0.689 0.941 0.865 0.593 1.112 0.933 0.033 0.110 0.222 0.182 0.280 0.027 0.146 0.2499
113 Netherlands 1 1 0 0 0.9441 0.932 1.560 0.969 1.039 0.999 0.945 0.021 0.181 0.222 0.140 0.120 0.058 0.258 0.1060
114 New Zealand 3 0 1 0 1.1972 1.301 1.394 1.451 1.284 1.297 1.447 0.033 0.108 0.194 0.120 0.115 0.030 0.400 0.0124
115 Norway 2 0 1 0 1.5618 1.850 2.044 2.082 1.675 1.809 2.153 0.019 0.106 0.302 0.139 0.097 0.034 0.303 0.1046
116 Poland 1 1 0 0 0.7478 0.574 0.757 0.676 0.527 0.858 0.787 0.051 0.117 0.227 0.171 0.134 0.043 0.257 -0.0076
117 Portugal 2 0 1 0 0.8635 1.024 0.876 1.069 0.841 1.205 1.036 0.033 0.166 0.354 0.188 0.131 0.030 0.099 0.1790










D0 D1 D2 PLI1 PLI2 PLI3 PLI4 PLI5 PLI6 PLI7 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7
119 Russian Federationd 3 0 1 0 0.8175 0.620 1.039 0.950 0.714 0.946 0.859 0.047 0.115 0.327 0.182 0.165 0.023 0.140 0.0147
120 Serbia 4 0 0 1 1.1201 0.663 0.879 0.982 0.537 1.101 0.933 0.039 0.134 0.246 0.174 0.207 0.017 0.182 -0.3025
121 Slovakia 3 0 1 0 0.8789 0.807 1.002 1.051 0.841 1.319 1.028 0.065 0.156 0.289 0.224 0.105 0.017 0.144 -0.1658
122 Slovenia 3 0 1 0 1.1413 1.038 1.327 1.082 0.813 1.183 1.010 0.033 0.133 0.238 0.208 0.128 0.055 0.204 -0.0774
123 Spain 1 1 0 0 0.9412 1.182 1.068 0.987 0.905 1.287 0.974 0.016 0.133 0.364 0.150 0.157 0.044 0.137 0.1470
124 Sweden 3 0 1 0 0.9805 1.478 1.592 1.126 1.383 1.417 1.207 0.032 0.121 0.239 0.186 0.111 0.059 0.252 0.0952
125 Switzerland 3 0 1 0 1.2869 1.642 2.945 1.465 1.418 1.546 1.417 0.029 0.130 0.265 0.179 0.153 0.026 0.219 0.1136
126 Turkey 3 0 1 0 1.2420 0.617 1.053 1.173 0.627 1.421 0.922 0.042 0.098 0.229 0.219 0.200 0.057 0.154 -0.1051
127 United Kingdom 1 1 0 0 0.8708 0.879 1.266 1.046 1.108 0.999 1.031 0.062 0.094 0.228 0.149 0.173 0.044 0.250 -0.0706
128 United States 1 1 0 0 1.0000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.031 0.143 0.227 0.111 0.106 0.034 0.348 0.0000
129 Bolivia 2 0 1 0 0.6205 0.494 0.546 0.926 0.444 1.286 0.655 0.125 0.093 0.260 0.141 0.152 0.030 0.200 -0.9773
130 Brazil 1 1 0 0 0.7255 0.960 0.877 1.305 0.781 1.516 1.114 0.138 0.108 0.237 0.199 0.127 0.021 0.170 -0.5134
131 Colombia 4 0 0 1 0.5955 0.825 0.726 1.194 0.622 1.762 1.038 0.136 0.076 0.243 0.191 0.230 0.002 0.122 -0.7542
132 Costa Rica 5 0 0 1 0.7396 0.943 1.052 1.360 0.740 1.477 1.089 0.114 0.098 0.225 0.249 0.091 0.015 0.208 -0.4988
133 Dominican Republic 5 0 0 1 0.5603 0.607 0.641 1.138 0.599 1.198 0.734 0.108 0.055 0.263 0.201 0.143 0.033 0.195 -0.2875
134 Ecuador 2 0 1 0 0.5186 0.940 0.709 0.967 0.491 1.080 0.746 0.166 0.080 0.264 0.221 0.080 0.015 0.174 -0.7991
135 El Salvador 5 0 0 1 0.8015 0.703 0.747 1.055 0.604 1.256 0.748 0.102 0.184 0.168 0.182 0.103 0.015 0.246 -0.6177
136 Guatemala 5 0 0 1 0.8464 0.755 0.660 1.061 0.578 1.029 0.744 0.203 0.224 0.123 0.110 0.227 0.005 0.108 -0.3671
137 Haiti 5 0 0 1 1.0193 0.337 0.759 0.828 0.468 0.980 0.903 0.500 0.052 0.166 0.089 0.118 0.014 0.061 -1.2603
138 Honduras 5 0 0 1 0.7322 0.622 0.701 1.097 0.583 1.039 0.808 0.189 0.067 0.161 0.193 0.138 0.002 0.250 -1.0730
139 Nicaragua 5 0 0 1 0.4977 0.640 0.508 1.013 0.519 1.503 0.758 0.166 0.091 0.175 0.185 0.150 0.003 0.231 -1.3644
140 Panama 5 0 0 1 0.5337 0.683 0.643 1.256 0.880 1.020 0.839 0.138 0.087 0.335 0.184 0.076 0.023 0.157 -0.5700
141 Paraguay 2 0 1 0 0.7877 0.633 0.667 0.883 0.703 1.384 0.870 0.069 0.138 0.303 0.220 0.138 0.005 0.127 -0.7164
142 Peru 2 0 1 0 0.6579 0.741 0.654 1.194 0.475 1.195 0.877 0.140 0.118 0.236 0.144 0.187 0.030 0.145 -0.5950
143 Uruguay 1 1 0 0 0.8726 1.198 0.869 1.172 0.986 1.540 1.420 0.037 0.197 0.281 0.158 0.151 0.027 0.150 -0.2178
144 Venezuela, RB 2 0 1 0 0.9009 1.181 1.035 1.494 1.677 1.309 1.703 0.074 0.100 0.266 0.137 0.280 0.016 0.126 -0.7297




3 0 1 0 1.2046 0.839 0.995 1.435 1.729 1.574 1.139 0.099 0.081 0.204 0.134 0.175 0.106 0.202 -0.7045
147 Aruba 5 0 0 1 1.2849 1.146 0.953 1.224 1.374 1.334 1.126 0.092 0.093 0.260 0.141 0.143 0.035 0.237 -0.5390
148 Bahamas, The 3 0 1 0 1.3416 1.503 0.982 1.456 1.418 1.647 1.456 0.069 0.060 0.291 0.093 0.172 0.055 0.261 -0.6009
149 Barbados 3 0 1 0 1.0846 0.994 0.998 1.670 1.844 1.638 1.303 0.081 0.101 0.355 0.159 0.164 0.023 0.118 -0.3578
150 Belize 3 0 1 0 0.8289 0.678 0.797 1.261 0.994 1.190 1.112 0.194 0.053 0.221 0.176 0.083 0.055 0.217 -1.1836
151 Bermuda 3 0 1 0 2.0815 1.909 1.434 1.845 2.197 1.698 1.682 0.044 0.083 0.262 0.152 0.179 0.031 0.249 0.4059
152 Cayman Islands 5 0 0 1 1.3530 1.544 1.264 1.849 2.123 1.723 1.504 0.050 0.073 0.184 0.138 0.159 0.068 0.328 -0.3050
153 Curaçao 5 0 0 1 0.9096 0.853 0.860 1.122 1.207 1.234 1.022 0.060 0.147 0.263 0.118 0.132 0.038 0.243 -0.2948
154 Dominica 3 0 1 0 0.8635 0.611 0.927 1.686 1.611 1.856 1.223 0.099 0.150 0.266 0.140 0.187 0.033 0.126 -0.7825
155 Grenada 3 0 1 0 1.0893 0.940 0.861 1.487 1.361 1.719 1.341 0.164 0.081 0.315 0.178 0.105 0.024 0.133 -0.5464
156 Jamaica 3 0 1 0 1.1106 0.965 1.047 1.598 1.262 1.927 1.147 0.107 0.100 0.215 0.091 0.258 0.049 0.180 -0.6541
157 Montserrat 5 0 0 1 0.9749 0.928 1.022 1.890 2.381 1.696 1.585 0.047 0.172 0.281 0.128 0.087 0.038 0.247 -0.5101
158 St. Kitts and Nevis 3 0 1 0 1.1708 1.115 1.042 1.921 1.645 1.646 1.425 0.081 0.141 0.249 0.120 0.115 0.071 0.223 -0.5436
159 St. Lucia 3 0 1 0 0.6822 0.869 0.908 1.534 1.310 1.387 1.102 0.072 0.102 0.229 0.126 0.152 0.030 0.289 -0.7671
160
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines
3 0 1 0 0.9894 0.862 0.845 1.444 1.711 1.384 1.346 0.109 0.131 0.284 0.136 0.176 0.044 0.120 -0.7697
161 Sint Maarten 5 0 0 1 0.9919 1.300 1.111 1.319 1.118 1.368 1.011 0.071 0.070 0.201 0.118 0.121 0.048 0.370 -0.5836
162 Suriname 5 0 0 1 0.5259 0.746 0.891 1.301 1.403 1.134 0.991 0.136 0.139 0.257 0.189 0.130 0.014 0.135 -0.5291
163 Trinidad and Tobago 3 0 1 0 0.9664 0.908 0.958 1.441 1.056 1.396 0.901 0.129 0.065 0.220 0.151 0.199 0.024 0.212 -0.0551
164
Turks and Caicos 
Islands
5 0 0 1 1.4159 1.424 1.026 1.683 1.413 1.902 1.431 0.069 0.061 0.279 0.116 0.196 0.068 0.211 -0.8427
165 Virgin Islands, British 5 0 0 1 1.8945 1.757 1.166 1.838 1.754 1.737 1.412 0.077 0.067 0.324 0.103 0.189 0.061 0.180 -0.4419
166 Bahrain 3 0 1 0 1.0027 0.446 0.500 1.011 0.629 1.045 0.773 0.076 0.074 0.265 0.173 0.190 0.062 0.161 -0.0418
167 Iraq 4 0 0 1 0.8400 0.482 0.806 0.934 0.464 0.702 0.752 0.159 0.051 0.206 0.151 0.289 0.055 0.089 -0.7492
168 Jordan 3 0 1 0 0.7376 0.301 0.901 0.983 0.479 0.863 0.759 0.070 0.079 0.276 0.177 0.176 0.001 0.221 -0.3710
169 Kuwait 4 0 0 1 0.8726 0.616 0.693 1.014 0.579 0.975 0.795 0.067 0.068 0.382 0.123 0.121 0.090 0.149 0.2981
170 Oman 3 0 1 0 1.0635 0.499 0.611 0.954 0.574 0.782 0.710 0.095 0.038 0.325 0.152 0.176 0.055 0.158 -0.0295
171 Palestinian Territory 5 0 0 1 1.2180 0.624 1.076 1.206 0.551 0.834 0.879 0.103 0.092 0.288 0.144 0.170 0.070 0.133 -0.8750
172 Qatar 3 0 1 0 0.8579 0.624 0.613 1.110 0.661 1.031 0.865 0.056 0.068 0.341 0.132 0.218 0.064 0.122 0.0512




5 0 0 1 0.9521 0.751 0.794 1.081 0.690 0.898 0.787 0.079 0.071 0.302 0.158 0.205 0.017 0.167 0.3633
175 Yemen 3 0 1 0 0.9676 0.343 0.777 0.933 0.589 0.643 0.712 0.252 0.026 0.228 0.191 0.115 0.011 0.177 -1.3794
176 Georgia 3 0 1 0 1.0842 0.602 0.891 1.142 0.378 1.041 0.953 0.075 0.141 0.156 0.291 0.183 0.025 0.129 -0.7158









9.3. ANNEX III – SAS CODE FOR FINAL FIRST STAGE ITSUR ESTIMATION 
Proc model data=thesis.FirstStageData2 outparms = thesis.parmsFirstFinal; 
 endogenous W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7; 
 exogenous PLI1 PLI2 PLI3 PLI4 PLI5 PLI6 PLI7 q; 
 parameters alfa1 alfa2 alfa3 alfa4 alfa5 alfa6 alfa7 
  beta1 beta2 beta3 beta4 beta5 beta6 beta7 fi h1 h2 h3; 
 ID  C Countries Group; 
 label W1='Food Nonalc. beverages Share' W2='Clothing Footwear Share' 
  W3='Housing Water Electr. Gas Oth. fuels Share' W4='Furnishings Household equip. 
Maintenance Share' 
  W5='Health Share' W6='Transport Communication Share' 
  W7='Education Share' 
  PLI1='Food Nonalc. beverages PLI' PLI2='Clothing Footwear PLI' 
  PLI3='Housing Water Electr. Gas Oth. fuels PLI' PLI4='Furnishings Household equip. 
Maintenance PLI' 
  PLI5='Health Share PLI' PLI6='Transport Communication PLI' 
  PLI7='Education Share' 
  q='LN Real Expenditure pc' fi='Income flexibility'; 






  +(alfa3+beta3*q)*gmPLI3+(alfa4+beta4*q)*gmPLI4+(alfa5+beta5*q)*gmPLI5 
  +(alfa6+beta6*q)*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*q)*gmPLI7)) 




  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 




  +(alfa3+beta3*q)*gmPLI3+(alfa4+beta4*q)*gmPLI4+(alfa5+beta5*q)*gmPLI5 
  +(alfa6+beta6*q)*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*q)*gmPLI7)) 




  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 








  +(alfa6+beta6*q)*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*q)*gmPLI7)) 




  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 




  +(alfa3+beta3*q)*gmPLI3+(alfa4+beta4*q)*gmPLI4+(alfa5+beta5*q)*gmPLI5 
  +(alfa6+beta6*q)*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*q)*gmPLI7)) 




  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 




  +(alfa3+beta3*q)*gmPLI3+(alfa4+beta4*q)*gmPLI4+(alfa5+beta5*q)*gmPLI5 
  +(alfa6+beta6*q)*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*q)*gmPLI7)) 




  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 




  +(alfa3+beta3*q)*gmPLI3+(alfa4+beta4*q)*gmPLI4+(alfa5+beta5*q)*gmPLI5 
  +(alfa6+beta6*q)*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*q)*gmPLI7)) 




  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 
  H.six=(sigma6**2)+(sigma6**2)*h1*D1+(sigma6**2)*h2*D2+(sigma6**2)*h3*q; 
   
 eq.seven=W7-(alfa7+beta7*q+(alfa7+beta7*q)*(gmPLI7- 
((alfa1+beta1*q)*gmPLI1+(alfa2+beta2*q)*gmPLI2 
  +(alfa3+beta3*q)*gmPLI3+(alfa4+beta4*q)*gmPLI4+(alfa5+beta5*q)*gmPLI5 








  +(alfa6+beta6*(1+q))*gmPLI6+(alfa7+beta7*(1+q))*gmPLI7))); 
 
  H.seven=(sigma7**2)+(sigma7**2)*h1*D1+(sigma7**2)*h2*D2+(sigma7**2)*h3*q; 
 
 fit one two three four five six seven   
  ESTDATA=thesis.parmsFitFirstFinalITOLS 
  ITSUR PRL=LR 
  METHOD= GAUSS 
  VARDEF=DF 
  MISSING=DELETE 
  OUTRESID 
  OUT=thesis.ResidualsFirstFinal 
  OUTEST=thesis.parmsFitFirstFinalITSUR OUTCOV 
  OUTS=thesis.EstimatedEqErrorsFirstFinal 
  BREUSCH=(1 q) 
  NORMAL WHITE 
  PRINTALL 
  ITPRINT 
  CONVERGE=(0.001,0.001) 
  NESTIT; 
quit; 
 
 
 
 
 
